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Franco Motta
NATURE, FAITH AND THE JUDGE OF FAITH 
Some Considerations on the Historical-Political Context 
of Copernicus’ Condemnation
1.  The denunciation of Galileo and the first examination of Coperni-
canism by the Inquisition
The dossier against Galileo that reached the desk of  the Prefect of  
the Index, Cardinal Sfondrati, in February 1615 contains several interest-
ing charges. According to it, some «Galileists, who maintain that the Earth 
moves and the Sun stands still», are active in Florence; they have drafted a 
‘scripture’ where it can be read that the Bible presents some unfit (inconve-
nienti) expressions, and that the Holy Writ should be the last text to be tak-
en into consideration on questions of  natural philosophy since it matters 
only in questions of  faith and its exegetes often fall into error.1 The author 
of  the dossier, the Dominican friar Niccolò Lorini of  Florence, enclosed 
a copy of  this incriminating document with the «suspect or hazardous» 
sentences duly underlined. As we know, the ‘scripture’ or text in question 
was the letter of  Galileo to Benedetto Castelli and the sentences brought to 
the attention of  the censors all pertain to issues of  biblical hermeneutics.2
1 Niccolò Lorini to Paolo Sfondrati, February 1615, in OG, XIX, pp. 298-299. For a deeper 
analysis of  the inquiry that led to the condemnation of  Copernicus in 1616 see, among the 
most recent studies, John L. Heilbron, Galileo, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 200 
sq.; Alfredo Damanti, “Libertas philosophandi”. Teologia e filosofia nella Lettera alla grandu-
chessa Cristina di Lorena di Galileo Galilei, Rome, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2010, pp. 49 
sq.; Annibale Fantoli, Galileo e la Chiesa. Una controversia ancora aperta, Rome, Carocci, 2010, 
pp. 101 sq.; Michele Camerota, Galileo Galilei e la cultura scientifica nell’età della Controriforma, 
Rome, Salerno, 2004, pp. 260 sq.
2 Processo di Galileo, OG, XIX, pp. 299-304. The copy of  the letter to Castelli delivered by 
Lorini to the Index diverges in some important passages from the more widespread version; 
according to Mauro Pesce, this is the effect of  the rewriting of  it by Galileo himself  (Mauro 
Pesce, L’ermeneutica biblica di Galileo e le due strade della teologia cristiana, Rome, Edizioni di sto-
ria e letteratura, 2005, pp. 29 sq.).
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Father Tommaso Caccini, who was the first to denounce Galileo, from 
the pulpit of  Santa Maria Novella, confirmed these charges in a testimony 
released on March 20 at the Holy Office. According to him, it is «public 
knowledge» (the expression is borrowed from the terminology of  crimi-
nal law of  the time) that Galileo believes in the motion of  the Earth and 
the immobility of  the Sun. But his deposition cited further elements: that 
Galileo «is considered a good Catholic by many, but is suspect in matters of  
faith to others, since it is said that he is very close to that friar Paolo the Ser-
vite, so famous in Venice for his impieties»; that he has already attracted the 
attention of  the Inquisition; and that he is the member of  an «academy» 
which maintains contacts with «others, in Germany». Furthermore, his pu-
pils would affirm that «God is in no way substance, but rather accident», 
that He is in some way provided with senses, and that «the miracles which 
are said to be performed by saints are not real miracles».3
Therefore, the picture taking shape before the eyes of  Michelangelo 
Seghizzi, commissioner to the Holy Office, presented decidedly suspect fea-
tures: Galileo was a close acquaintance of  the Venetian intellectual Paolo 
Sarpi – for ten years among the most insidious enemies of  the Apostolic 
See – and formed part of  a cenacle with ties to Germany on various points 
of  shared interest (in Rome «the matters of  Germany» usually referred to 
anything relating to Protestantism). Assertions were attributed to Galileo’s 
students that were apparently contrary to scholastic metaphysics and the 
cult of  saints.
The investigation, which would stretch out over the following months, 
was assigned to Cardinal Millini, secretary to the Holy Office, since this 
congregation had exclusive competence in matters of  faith. In his testimo-
ny Caccini cited Father Ferdinando Ximenes as the expert who had collect-
ed the compromising phrases de auditu, i.e. he had actually heard them spo-
ken. Ximenes, when questioned on this, confirmed in large part Caccini’s 
statements (except those regarding the cult of  saints), mentioning in turn 
a presumed student of  Galileo, Giannozzo Attavanti. When questioned a 
day later, Attavanti rejected the accusation in toto, attributing the charges to 
a misunderstanding on the part of  Ximenes of  their conversation.4
The case apparently finishes here. The friendship between Galileo and 
Sarpi; the suspicions that were circulating with regard to Galileo’s position 
on «matters of  faith»; the declarations ascribed to the «Galileists» concern-
ing the substance and the senses of  God or the origins of  miracles – none 
3 Processo di Galileo, OG, XIX, pp. 307-311.
4 Ibid., pp. 316-320.
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of  this seemed to have had any consequences. Benedetto Castelli, the orig-
inal recipient of  the letter that Lorini had passed to the Holy Office, was 
not even interrogated. He merely received a paternal admonition from 
the Archbishop of  Pisa, Monsignor Bonciani, who on March 12 warned 
him to abandon the «peculiar opinions» of  Copernicus, since «beyond be-
ing a pack of  nonsense, they were dangerous, scandalous, and reckless 
[pericolose, scandalose e temerarie], being in outright opposition to the Sa-
cred Scriptures».5
The adjectives ‘dangerous’, ‘scandalous’ and ‘reckless’ were technical 
terms drawn directly from the terminology used by the qualificators and 
consultants to the Inquisition when defining the degree of  deviation of  a 
proposition from orthodox doctrine. This meant that even before the testi-
mony of  Caccini issued on March 20, based on the denunciation of  Lorini 
alone, heliocentrism had already raised the suspicions of  the authorities 
responsible for the appraisal and censoring of  ideas. Indeed, during a ple-
nary session of  the Holy Office held on March 19, Pope Paul V ordered 
Caccini to be interrogated regarding the «errors of  the aforesaid Galileo», 
thus branding them as such even before any theological examination had 
been conducted.6
One year later, notwithstanding a written denunciation and two testi-
monies focusing not on Copernicanism itself, but rather on its implications 
for the interpretation of  the Bible, on the hierarchy between philosophy 
and theology in the explanation of  natural phenomena, and on other the-
ses concerning theological and metaphysical questions, the decision of  the 
Holy Office was to submit to the censors two simple sentences limited 
to the strictly astronomical aspect of  Copernicus’ astronomy and leaving 
aside any philosophical implications: «That the Sun is the center of  the 
world, and consequently motionless in its place [immobile di moto locale]. 
That the Earth is neither the center of  the world nor motionless, but moves 
around itself, also with a daily motion».7 Such was the text submitted to the 
consultants on 19 February 1616, exactly one year after Lorini’s denuncia-
tion – two sentences drawn almost word for word from the testimony of  
Caccini («The Earth moves around itself, also with daily motion; the Sun 
5 Benedetto Castelli to Galileo, 12 March 1615, OG, XII, pp. 153-154. It must be remarked 
that, f rom Bellarmine’s correspondence preserved in the Jesuit archives in Rome (see below, 
notes 12 and 21), Monsignor Bonciani appears to have close and stable relationships with the 
Cardinal.




is motionless»), as if  no one had taken it upon himself  to actually read Co-
pernicus’ contested book.
In other words, the Inquisitors seemed to be suffering from a certain 
lack of  zeal, which is quite surprising, especially since in the middle of  
February 1615 another anonymous consultant to the Holy Office had been 
given a copy of  Galileo’s letter to Castelli, and he pointed out three further 
dubious assertions dealing with the question of  the truth of  Scripture, Gal-
ileo having used unwary expressions such as «false propositions», «abstain» 
and «pervert» in relation to the actual text of  the Bible. In the consultant’s 
report these assertions were qualified as «male sonans» (‘evil sounding’).8
Now the use of  the term male sonans when referring to a proposition 
under theological evaluation is not to be taken as a vague or generic ac-
cusation. It belonged to the legal lexicon of  the Inquisition, which defined 
to a nicety the different possible degrees of  deviation from Catholic truth: 
‘evil sounding’ denoted the fourth degree of  error after those of  ‘heretical’, 
‘erroneous’ and ‘tasting of  heresy’ (sapiens haeresim).
We can find a detailed discussion of  this in an important work that laid 
out the methodology for the Counter-Reformation scholastic theology, the 
Loci theologici (Theological Commonplaces) (1563) by the Salamancan theolo-
gian Melchor Cano, in particular in book 12, “De locorum usu in scholas-
tica disputatione” (“On using commonplaces in a scholastic controversy”). 
Cano’s tome was not intended as a handbook for inquisitors, unlike fre-
quently cited texts such as the 14th century Inquisitor General of  Aragon 
Nicholas Eymerich’s Directorium Inquisitorum (republished by Francisco 
Peña in 1578) or Eliseo Masini’s Sacro Arsenale, ovvero Pratica dell’Uffizio della 
Santa Inquisizione (1621), which provided generations of  inquisitors with 
the rules for trials in cases of  faith. Cano’s treatise was rather intended to 
train theologians in the correct use of  the sources of  faith and in the con-
struction of  a well-established theological discourse. In this sense, it can be 
considered a broadly shared set of  standards on Catholic theology.9
8 Ibid., p. 305. The first two censored assertions can be found already underlined by Lorini 
in the copy of  the letter transmitted to the Index, while the third is autonomously identified 
by the anonymous consultant. If  not otherwise specified, all the original texts are translated 
by myself.
9 The importance of  Cano in the Second scholasticism is stressed by Melquiades An-
drés, El método teológico en la época moderna, in El método en teología, Valencia, Facultad de 
Teología San Vicente Ferrer, 1981, pp. 201-233, 223 sq., and Ignacio Jericó Bermejo, Regula 
fidei et veritas fidei catholica. El artículo de fe según Melchor Cano, «Scriptorium victoriense», 30, 
1983, pp. 277-315. Cano’s consideration of  the doctrinal notes is analysed by Bruno Neveu, 
L’erreur et son juge. Remarques sur les censures doctrinales à l’époque moderne, Naples, Bibliopolis, 
1993, pp. 272 sq.
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In a technical sense (specialiter), according to Cano «We properly term 
evil sounding, and offensive to pious ears those propositions where not a 
manifest error against faith, but rather something out-of-tune and absurd 
can be noted, appearing shameful to pious and religious ears».10
Obviously, ascribing to a suspect sentence this lesser and more subtle 
degree of  incorrectness could be a delicate task and Cano reminded his 
readers: «It is foolhardy insolence to regard as a crime what the Church has 
never considered as such». Declaring that the Blessed Virgin was tainted 
with the original sin of  Adam would sound bad «to the ears of  the people», 
even if  theologically it was a fully legitimate sentence (the Dominican or-
der, to which Cano belonged, was rigidly hostile to the doctrine of  the 
Immaculate Conception), and the same would be found even for some pas-
sages in the Gospel, «should we let ourselves be led by the mob». So we 
may properly deem as male sonantes those sentences that «although not 
tasting of  heresy, nevertheless show an absurd and extraneous sound, dis-
agreeing with the sound teaching and the authentic and well-founded way 
of  speaking of  the Church».11
Cano added some examples of  evil-sounding statements: for example, 
the declaration that the emperor Constantine and Pope Sylvester had made 
a mistake when they endowed the Church with temporal possessions, or 
that the Roman Church is the synagogue of  Satan, and so on. It can be seen 
that these assertions were not strictly heretical since they had never been 
formally condemned by a council, but they were nonetheless openly oppo-
site to tradition. This was the degree of  incorrectness that the anonymous 
consultant to the Holy Office attributed to three passages in Galileo’s letter 
to Castelli.
There is no doubt that an assessment of  this kind must have created 
some alarm among the cardinals of  the Congregation of  the Inquisition 
(indeed, during this period revised copies of  Galileo’s letter were being cir-
culated on the scientist’s behalf  in power circles in Rome by his friend, the 
prelate Monsignor Piero Dini of  Florence, reaching the cardinals Barberini, 
Del Monte and Bellarmine). Furthermore, at the beginning of  March 1615 
Foscarini published his Lettera sopra l’opinione de’ Pittagorici, which was en-
tirely devoted to establishing an unprecedented theological concordance 
between Copernicanism and the Bible. And no later than early June the 
manuscript letter written by Galileo to the Grand Duchess Christina was 
10 Melchor Cano, Locorum theologicorum libri XII, here in the 1734 edition, Patavii, typis 




beginning to circulate; in it the scientist expanded on some of  the consid-
erations that he had touched upon in his letter to Castelli, advancing his 
new hermeneutical proposal of  a separation between the scientific and the 
religious spheres and the pre-eminence of  the experimental method in ex-
plaining natural phenomena.12
2.  The crisis of the Sacred College and the “solitude” of Cardinal 
Bellarmine
To what I’ve summed up so far it must be added that in 1615 the whole 
matter still revolved around a “missing guest” –  that is, Nicolaus Coper-
nicus, whose book De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, which he dedicated 
to Pope Paul III, had appeared in print more than seventy years before, 
remaining since then a rare volume (it was reprinted only once, in Basel, 
in 1566), and circulating only among professional astronomers.13 On the 
other hand, Galileo’s two recent booklets showing strong evidence of  the 
tenability of  the Copernican system, the Sidereus nuncius (1610) and the 
Istoria e dimostrazioni intorno alle macchie solari (1613), had gained a Europe-
wide reputation, and the author was even praised in 1611 for his heavenly 
discoveries by the renowned Jesuit astronomers of  the Roman College.
We must also keep in mind that the Copernican question remained a mar-
ginal problem for the Roman Curia when compared with the much larger is-
sues which were at stake at the time, involving the fundamental relationship 
between temporal and spiritual power and the struggle for hegemony be-
tween the Apostolic See with its historic prerogatives and the growing claims 
of  secular rulers. In this very context, however, interesting analogies can be 
found between the debate over heliocentrism and the theological-political is-
sues of  the period – analogies that, as I will attempt to show, should be taken 
into consideration in assessing the reasons that led the Congregation of  the 
Index (Congregatio pro Indice Librorum Prohibitorum, created in 1571 by Pius 
V) to issue their prohibition of  Copernicanism ut thesis (‘as a thesis’) in 1616.
As we know, the responsibility for resolving the question raised by 
Lorini and Caccini and countered by the alternative proposals of  Foscarini 
12 That Bellarmine must have known Galileo’s letter to Christina is proved by the Cardi-
nal’s autograph note in Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Opp. NN. 245, c. 43 (see Damanti, 
“Libertas philosophandi”, cit. note 1, pp. 365-366).
13 The rareness of  the De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, at the time, is remarked by Mi-
chel-Pierre Lerner, L’hérésie heliocentrique: du soupçon à la condamnation, in Sciences et religions 
de Copernic à Galilée (1540-1610), Rome, École Française de Rome, 1999, pp. 69-91, 75.
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and Galileo fell to the Jesuit cardinal and theologian Robert Bellarmine. A 
trusted advisor to the papacy, he served as the unofficial mediator on the 
case for the Holy Office and undoubtedly for Paul V himself. On such a 
complex issue Bellarmine probably seemed the natural candidate; he was 
universally esteemed for his learning and had earned a reputation for diplo-
matic tact after serving in the summer of  1591 on the special commission 
established to correct the many errors introduced by Pope Sixtus V in the 
revised edition of  the Vulgate – an embarrassing incident that had shown 
the Sacred College how delicate questions touching on the letter of  the 
Bible could be.14
Bellarmine accompanied, so to speak, from start to finish what has 
been called the ‘first trial’ of  Galileo. As we know, in April 1611 he had 
requested the opinion of  the mathematicians of  the Roman College on 
the veracity of  the new astronomical discoveries: notwithstanding the full 
confirmation which he received, his initial suspicion regarding the scientist, 
as far as we know, dates from that circumstance.15 In a conversation with 
Prince Federico Cesi (founder of  the Accademia dei Lincei) presumably 
dating to early January 1615 and therefore preceding Lorini’s denunciation, 
he declared, in Cesi’s words, that: «As for Copernicus’ opinion [...] he holds 
it to be heretical, and that the motion of  the Earth, without any doubt, 
is against Scripture».16 He was the advisor whom Paul V summoned to a 
meeting on 24 February 1616 following a harsh confrontation with Cardi-
nal Alessandro Orsini, at the end of  which the pope concluded that «Gali-
leo’s opinion» must be considered «erroneous and heretical».17 Finally, Bel-
larmine is the one who notifies the scientist on February 26 of  the report 
handed down two days before by the consultants to the Holy Office and 
14 The incident is briefly retraced in Franco Motta, Bellarmino. Una teologia politica della 
Controriforma, Brescia, Morcelliana, 2005, pp. 586 sq.
15 «Among the others, Bellarmine told me [...] that if  [Galileo] would have stayed here 
too long, they couldn’t do without asking him some justifications of  his case»: Piero Guic-
ciardini to Curzio Picchena, 5 December, 1615, recalling Galileo’s visit to Rome four years 
earlier, OG, XII, pp. 206-207; Bellarmine’s letters to the Fathers of  the Roman College and their 
response, OG, XI, pp. 87-88. On the cardinal’s views in astronomical matters see Ugo Baldini, 
L’astronomia del cardinale and Bellarmino tra vecchia e nuova scienza, in Id., Legem impone subac-
tis. Studi su filosofia e scienza dei gesuiti in Italia, 1540-1632, Rome, Bulzoni, 1992, pp. 285-303, 
305-344. Baldini’s studies have raised some critics, centered not on the depth of  his inquiry but 
rather on his interpretive approach, emphasizing the ‘modernity’ of  the perspective of  Bel-
larmine and, more generally, of  the Jesuits about the relation between faith and science: see, 
for instance, Maurizio Torrini, Da Galileo a Kircher: percorsi della scienza gesuitica, «Galilæana», 
2, 2005, pp. 3-17.
16 Cesi to Galileo, 12 January 1615, OG, XII, pp. 128-130, 129.
17 Piero Guicciardini to Cosimo II, 4 March 1616, OG, XII, pp. 241-243, 242.
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implicitly approved in the plenary session of  the Congregazione dell’Indice 
the day before – for which we have no minutes – whereby Copernicanism 
is condemned as erroneous and heretical.18
Based on the hints in letters received by Galileo from Tuscans living in 
Rome and members of  the Florentine court (all supporters of  the scientist, 
but each of  whom had his own views on his chances: Monsignor Dini was 
optimistic, while Prince Cesi was more cautious and the ambassador of  the 
grand duke, Guicciardini, was impatient with Galileo’s eagerness to stand 
up for his ideas), Cardinal Bellarmine’s stance during the fourteenth months 
preceding the official censure of  Copernicanism was somewhat vacillat-
ing. While, as we have seen, in January 1615 he declared «the opinion of  
Copernicus» and in February 1616 «the opinion of  Galileo» to be heretical 
(although in the latter case he may have been referring to the Copernican 
cosmology combined with the hermeneutical theses contained in Galileo’s 
letters to Castelli and Christina), in the interval between these two uncom-
promising statements he showed some willingness to engage in dialogue. 
On 7 March 1615 Monsignor Dini informed Galileo of  a conversation that 
he had had with the cardinal: «As for Copernicus [...] he does not believe 
that it is going to be prohibited, and the worst that could happen is that 
some glosses will be added, explaining that his doctrine was introduced to 
save appearances, or something of  the kind».19 And in fact this would prove 
to be the substance of  the decree issued one year later, not prohibiting but 
rather «suspending» the De revolutionibus orbium coelestium until it could be 
amended. At the same time Father Christoph Grienberger of  the Roman 
College assured Dini that Bellarmine was well disposed toward the receipt 
of  any further mathematical evidence of  heliocentrism that Galileo might 
provide before approaching the biblical question.20
It must be added that Bellarmine’s behavior was probably influenced 
by serious diplomatic considerations – on one side the deference due to the 
House of  Medici of  which he was a ‘natural’ subject, having been born in 
Montepulciano, and on the other his close dealings with Christina of  Lor-
18 Processo a Galileo, OG, XIX, pp. 321-322. As is well known, the genuineness of  the Bellar-
mine’s notification to Galileo has been strongly debated. The hypothesis that the document is 
a forgery drafted in Rome, during the 1633 trial, has been advanced through a well-researched 
analysis by Vittorio Frajese, Il processo a Galileo Galilei. Il falso e la sua prova, Brescia, Morcel-
liana, 2010. Much criticism about Frajese’s hypothesis has then been expressed by Sergio Pa-
gano, Il precetto del cardinale Bellarmino a Galileo: un ‘falso’?, con una parentesi sul radio, Madame 
Curie e i documenti galileiani, «Galilæana», 7, 2010, pp. 143-203.
19 Dini to Galileo, March 7, 1615, OG, XII, pp. 151-152.
20 Ibid., p. 151.
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raine as an intermediary with the Florentine court – as he protected the 
interests both of  his own family (Bellarmine presided over a large patron-
age network comprising his brothers, sisters, cousins and nephews) and 
the diocese of  Montepulciano, for which he held the role of  ‘protector’ 
in Rome.21 It was a member of  the House of  Medici – Mary, the widow 
of  Henry IV of  France and cousin of  the grand duke – who prevented the 
burning of  Bellarmine’s De potestate Summi pontificis in rebus temporalibus 
(‘On the power of  the pope in temporal matters’) in November 1610 by 
suspending the sentence issued by the Parliament of  Paris. The book had 
been condemned for damaging the monarchical prerogative and directly 
inspiring the theories on regicide that had materialized so menacingly a 
few months before with the assassination of  Henri IV.
There is no clear evidence regarding the differing viewpoints held with-
in the Sacred College, especially among the theologians of  the Holy Office 
and the Index, with respect to Copernicanism. The cardinal of  Aracoeli, 
Agostino Galamini  –  a zealous Dominican friar, and formerly inquisitor 
in Brescia, Genoa and Milan as well as Master of  the Sacred Palace – ap-
pears to have been Caccini’s contact and the promoter behind the scenes of  
the trial.22 Felice Centini – cardinal of  Ascoli, member of  the Friars Minor 
Conventual, and a docile creatura of  Pope Paul V with staunch pro-Spanish 
leanings  –  probably shared his position.23 In contrast Alessandro Orsini, 
Francesco Maria del Monte, and above all Bonifacio Caetani and Maffeo 
Barberini assumed a different posture; they were more prudent, even overt-
ly favorable to Galileo and to the legitimacy of  a heliocentric exegesis of  
the Bible.24
Faced with such a constellation of  opinions, Bellarmine appears to have 
adopted the position of  the mediator, made possible by his personal author-
ity and by his close proximity to the pope as his most influential advisor on 
theological matters. On the other hand, the fact that he was entrusted to 
21 Bellarmine’s correspondence with the Grand-Duchess Mother Christina, the Grand-
Duke and the Grand-Duchess, stored in the Archivio di Stato of  Florence and the Archivum 
Romanum Societatis Iesu, is also available in the typewritten copies drafted in the early 20th 
century by Fathers Xavier-Marie Le Bachelet and Sebastiaan Tromp (Epistolae Bellarmini), in the 
Archivio della Pontificia Università Gregoriana in Rome (Apug 1601-36).
22 Massimo Bucciantini, Contro Galileo: alle origini dell’affaire, Firenze, Olschki, 1995, 
pp. 38 sq.
23 On Galamini see Dizionario biografico degli italiani, vol. 51, pp. 325-326 (S. Rivabene); on 
Centini ibid., vol. 23, pp. 593-597 (G. Benzoni).
24 On the opposition of  Caetani and Barberini toward a condemnation of  Copernicanism 
for the charge of  heresy see the 1633 memo of  Giovanfrancesco Buonamici, OG, XV, p. 111 
and OG, XIX, pp. 407-411, mentioned by Camerota, Galileo Galilei (cit. note 1), p. 320.
FRANCO MOTTA
— 66 —
handle Copernicus’ case could be read as a symptom of  the overall weak-
ness of  the Sacred College, and more specifically of  the Congregations of  
the Index and of  the Inquisition in the second decade of  the 17th century.
Cardinal Bellarmine was born in 1542 (one year before the death of  
Copernicus and the publication of  his work) and by 1615 he was an elderly 
man. In January of  that year he published his celebrated De ascensione men-
tis in Deum per scalas rerum creatarum (‘On the ascension of  the mind to God 
through the ladder of  created things’), which testifies to his allegorical vi-
sion of  nature and hence his intellectual distance from any realist approach 
to natural philosophy. This book was also the first in a series of  devotional 
pamphlets that would appear annually until 1620, as if  in anticipation of  
the canonization process that the Society of  Jesus would undertake after 
his death in 1621.25
In other words, despite his tireless dedication to the Roman congre-
gations of  which he was a member (the Holy Office and the Index, but 
also the Congregation of  Rites which was responsible for the processes 
of  beatification and canonization, matters where his theological expertise 
would have been invaluable), Bellarmine seemed to be preparing to retire 
from his institutional commitments and withdraw into a life of  ascesis and 
spirituality. He had produced the magnum opus of  his intellectual career, 
the Disputationes de controversiis christianae fidei (‘Disputations about con-
troversies on the Christian faith’), some thirty years before and his later 
contributions to the theological and political debates of  the time –  such 
as the De potestate Summi pontificis in rebus temporalibus or his confutations 
of  the arguments of  James I and the theologians of  Venice against the su-
preme authority of  the pope – were little more than a reworking of  themes 
already dealt with in it.
In 1615 Bellarmine therefore was one of  the last remaining protagonists 
in a crucial period in the Church’s history that was coming to a close. He 
belonged to the generation of  theologians and prelates trained in the 16th 
century and called upon to interpret and enforce the decrees of  the Coun-
25 On Bellarmine’s epistemology in the light of  the De ascensione mentis in Deum see ibid., 
pp. 289-290, and more recently Francesco Barreca, Cosmologia ed ermeneutica biblica nel De 
ascensione mentis in Deum di Roberto Bellarmino, «Galilæana», 10, 2013, pp. 119-136. A com-
parison between his allegorical concept and the emblematic approach to natural knowledge, 
which was peculiar to the Jesuits’ Aristotelism  –  most famously represented by Athanasius 
Kircher –, has been first advanced by William B. Ashworth, Jr., Catholicism and Early Modern 
Science, in Daniel C. Lindberg – Ronald L. Numbers (eds.), God and Nature. Historical Essays 
on the Encounter between Christianity and Science, Berkeley, University of  California Press, 1986, 
pp. 136-166, and Rivka Feldhay – Michael Heyd, The Discourse of  Pious Science, «Science in 
Context», 3/1, 1989, pp. 102-142.
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cil of  Trent under the pontiffs Pius V, Gregory XIII and Sixtus V, thereby 
contributing to the rise of  the Counter-Reformation.
During the pontificate of  Paul V the Roman Curia was gradually de-
pleted of  the best of  this generation of  prelates, leading to the erosion 
of  its spiritual and intellectual standing and to a situation of  «crisis of  the 
Counter-Reformation», as Delio Cantimori described it in his essay on the 
trial of  Galileo.26
In my opinion the key to understanding the difficulty of  Bellarmine’s 
role in the episode of  Galileo’s ‘first trial’ lies here; that is, in the entire ab-
sence of  any official interlocutor in the Congregations of  the Index and the 
Holy Office, one capable of  drawing up a strategy to cope with an emerg-
ing new order of  knowledge that was gaining support across the Catholic 
world.
Here it will suffice to note a series of  prosopographical facts. The som-
mo inquisitore, Giulio Antonio Santori, last heir to the uncompromising line 
adopted by Paul IV and Pius V, a man of  the utmost severity who kept the 
reins of  power at the Holy Office firmly in his hands for more than twenty 
years, died in 1602. He was followed the next year by one of  his most influ-
ential opponents, Silvio Antoniano. The father of  Catholic pedagogy and 
the most gifted Latinist in the Curia, Antoniano had pressed for a milder 
policy with regard to the censorship of  books and therefore often found 
himself  at loggerheads with the Congregation of  the Inquisition. In 1606 
Cardinal Agostino Valier passed away; a humanist and a ‘reforming bish-
op’, one of  the founders of  the Tridentine rhetorical style, and mediator 
between Rome and the Republic of  Venice, he himself  advocated a certain 
degree of  tolerance (the partial lifting of  the ban on the works of  Erasmus’ 
works began with him). The scholarly Caesar Baronius, prefect of  the Vati-
can Library and author of  the founding text of  Catholic historiography, the 
Annales ecclesiastici, died in 1607, and Ascanio Colonna, one of  the most 
learned scholars and manuscript collectors in Rome, in 1608.
Some even more influential cardinals had passed away at the end of  
the preceding century: the powerful Giovanni Ludovico Madruzzo (1600), 
a key figure in relations between Rome and the Hapsburg imperial court; 
Marcantonio Colonna (1597), a member (together with Bellarmine) of  
the special commission on the Sixtine Vulgate, Prefect of  the Index, and 
himself  favorable to a policy of  expurgation rather than the outright pro-
hibition of  condemned books; and Francisco de Toledo (1596), the first 
26 Delio Cantimori, Galileo e la crisi della Controriforma, in Cantimori, Storici e storia, Tu-
rin, Einaudi, 1971, pp. 657-674.
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Jesuit to be appointed a cardinal, distinguished professor of  philosophy and 
theology at the Roman College, and a key player in the strategy of  rap-
prochement between the Apostolic See and the new French king, Henry of  
Navarre, the former leader of  the Huguenots.27
Most of  these prelates (apart from Santori) supported the policy of  a 
partial opening up of  the rights of  the book market; this led to the Index 
of  1596, a measure decided by Pope Clement VIII to moderate the harsh-
ness of  the previous Sixtine Index. Thus, formerly prohibited works were 
for a brief  period allowed to circulate after undergoing a process of  expur-
gation – books such as the Latin Bibles published in Protestant countries, 
and astrological works that had been condemned by Sixtus V in his Coeli 
et terrae creator.28 This period of  relative tolerance ended with the death 
of  Clement VIII (1605), but the decision in favour of  the expurgation of  
Copernicus’ work rather than prohibiting it outright seems to echo this 
precedent.
Moreover, these cardinals – like other prominent members of  the papal 
entourage such as Antonio Possevino, the author of  the Bibliotheca selecta 
(d. 1611) – were historians, writers, scholars, theologians and humanists of  
outstanding intellectual stature, architects of  the Tridentine cultural strat-
egy that, by employing profane knowledge for apologetic ends, provided 
the Church with suitable tools to oppose the Reformation and create a new 
hegemony in Catholic countries.
However, this exceptional generation left no real successors and in 
1615-1616 only Bellarmine and the celebrated Cardinal Federico Borro-
meo, founder of  the Biblioteca Ambrosiana in Milan, remained. The scion 
of  an influential family, Borromeo became a prelate of  exemplary virtue 
and scholarship, but he was based in Milan, having been appointed arch-
bishop there in 1595. These two cardinals found themselves having to deal 
with the Congregations of  the Index and the Holy Office, which were now 
dominated by lower level officials with a purely bureaucratic approach to 
censorship.
27 On Santoro, Antoniano, Valier, Baronio and Marcantonio Colonna, from the perspec-
tive of  their role in the Roman congregations, see the entries in Adriano Prosperi (ed.), Dizio-
nario storico dell’Inquisizione, Pisa, Edizioni della Normale, 2010, respectively III, pp. 1370-1377 
(S. Ricci); I, pp. 70-71 (M.T. Fattori); III, pp. 1638-1639 (M.T. Fattori); I, pp. 138-139 (M.T. Fat-
tori); I, p. 350 (P. Mazur). On Madruzzo and Ascanio Colonna see Dizionario biografico degli ita-
liani, respectively vol. 67, pp. 181-186 (R. Becker); vol. 27, pp. 275-278 (F. Petrucci). On Toledo, 
see Diccionario histórico de la Compañía de Jesús. Biográfico-temático, Rome-Madrid, Institutum 
historicum SI-Universidad pontificia Comillas, IV, pp. 3807-3808 ( J.P. Donnelly).
28 Frajese, Nascita dell’Indice. La censura ecclesiastica dal Rinascimento alla Controriforma, 
Brescia, Morcelliana, 2006, pp. 151 sq.
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It is not surprising that in the face of  the unprecedented challenge posed 
to the conception of  biblical truth by the implications of  heliocentrism and 
heliocentric exegesis, the Jesuit cardinal Bellarmine found himself  having to 
cope with a general sense of  uncertainty widespread in the Roman Curia.
3. An extrajudicial solution: Bellarmine’s letter to Foscarini
It is perhaps partly on these grounds that Bellarmine’s response to Gali-
leo and Foscarini took the shape of  a private admonition, as if  to avoid an 
official pronouncement from the Holy Office. Indeed, Bellarmine’s solu-
tion was a political rather than a judicial one, conveyed in the well-known 
‘confidential letter’  – which had in fact been conceived and written as a 
public letter – to Foscarini dated 12 April 1615.
Detailed analyses of  this document can be found elsewhere in the am-
ple historiographic literature on Galileo and Copernicanism.29 It is suffi-
cient here to remind the three main points under which – as was his cus-
tom – the cardinal developed his arguments. To begin, he posits that the 
merits of  heliocentrism can be discussed in an equitable manner if  the the-
ory is treated as a hypothesis («ex suppositione, and not absolutely») rather 
than as an objective fact since it overtly contradicts Scripture. Second, a 
Copernican interpretation of  Scripture does not accord with the consensus 
of  the Church Fathers and later commentators, and as such it is contrary 
to the statements on doctrine issued by the Council of  Trent. Third, the 
orbital motion of  the Earth and the immobility of  Sun has not yet been 
demonstrated by any physical evidence, and it is unlikely that it ever will 
be. Therefore, there is no reason to abandon the long-established empirical 
observation that the Sun moves in the third heaven.30
It is clear that Bellarmine chose to conclude that the notion of  heliocen-
trism must be rejected based on disciplinary rather than theological or sci-
entific grounds, based on the precept that the first obligation of  believers is 
obedience to the decrees of  the Church. He cited «the shared consensus of  
the Church Fathers» and «the modern commentaries on Genesis» without 
explicitly mentioning any authors; after all, even the most recent of  these, 
29 On the historiographical interpretations of  Bellarmine’s letter to Foscarini see Motta, 
Epistemologie cardinalizie. Ipotesi, verità, apologia, in Gian Mario Bravo – Vincenzo Ferrone 
(eds.), Il processo a Galilei e la questione galileiana, Rome, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2010, 
pp. 93-103.
30 OG, XII, pp. 171-172.
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such as the influential Jesuit theologians Jean Lorin ( Joannes Lorinus) and 
Nicolaus Serarius, had written their works before Galileo’s discoveries.31 
Instead, he bowed to the authority of  the Council of  Trent, considered at 
the time to be the definitive repository of  Catholic dogma.
As for Galileo’s argument that astronomical matters could be excluded 
from the binding jurisdiction of  the Bible because they did not pertain to 
faith, Bellarmine appealed to a strict biblical literalism when he ascribed 
the value of  truth to Geocentrism using evidence presented ex parte dicentis 
(‘according to who is speaking’). Yet he was perfectly aware that, accord-
ing to the Tridentine decrees, pars dicens (‘the part which is speaking’), i.e. 
the source of  truth, lies not only in Scripture (as stated in the Reformed 
principle of  the self-sufficiency of  the Bible), but also in the continuity be-
tween Scripture and tradition guided by the Church’s interpretation. Or, to 
cite the Council of  Trent, «the meaning which the Holy Mother Church, 
which is entitled to pass judgment on the real sense and the interpretation 
of  Scripture, has believed and currently believes».32 Here it is in fact the 
possibility of  a change in the Church’s attitude towards the connection be-
tween biblical truth and natural philosophy that is under discussion, at least 
according to Galileo’s proposal.
The position of  Bellarmine in the Controversiae – as well as that of  the 
entire body of  Catholic controversialist theologians in the age of  confes-
sions going back to Luther’s first opponent, Johannes Eck – was founded on 
the premise that «Scripture is not so clear in itself  as to be sufficient, with-
out further explanation, to resolve controversies of  faith»  –  where such 
controversies also, and indeed primarily, include where to draw the divid-
ing line between what pertains to faith and what does not.33
Within the doctrinal context of  Catholic scholasticism, which was char-
acterized by an objective rather than a subjective conception of  faith – that 
31 Special attention has been devoted by scholars to the Jesuits Juan de Pineda, Commen-
tariorum in Job libri tredecim, 1598 and 1602, Jean Lorin, Acta apostolorum commentaria, 1605, 
Nicolaus Serarius, Iosue, ab utero ad ipsum usque tumulum, 1609, who rely on Clavius in ruling 
out the plausibility of  a heliocentric exegesis of  the Bible. Volker R. Remmert, “Sonne steh still 
über Gibeon”, «Zeitschrift für historische Forschung», 28, 2001, pp. 539-580: 559 sq. See also Ir-
ving A. Kelter, The Refusal to Accommodate: Jesuit Exegetes and the Copernican System, «Sixteenth 
Century Journal», 26/2, 1995, pp. 273-283.
32 Concilium Tridentinum, ed. Societas Goerresiana, V, Actorum pars altera, sess. IV, April 8, 
1546, decr. II on the authenticity of  the Vulgate, p. 92.
33 Disputationes de controversiis christianae fidei adversus huius temporis haereticos, here in the 
Venetian edition of  Bellarmine’s Opera omnia, apud Ioannem Malachinum, 1721-28, I, I contro-
versy De Verbo Dei, b. 3 De Verbi Dei interpretatione, ch. 1, Scripturam non esse tam apertam per se, 
ut sine explicatione sufficiat ad controversias fidei terminandas, p. 64.
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is, faith conceived as a complex of  dogmatic articles rather than the moving 
of  the individual conscience towards God – the importance to the religious 
sphere of  a statement made in the profane (that is, merely secular or philo-
sophical) sphere depended not so much on its content as on whether the 
Church considered it to be binding. In other words, it was not actually the 
subject of  a proposition that decided whether it was to be considered de 
fide, rather that the magisterium or Church tradition had taken a position 
on the matter (or were thought to have, as in case of  Geocentrism accord-
ing to Bellarmine). What was de fide simply had to be believed in ‘on faith’, 
whereas what was not de fide could be left to the discretion of  the faithful 
or – better – could be debated among the different theological schools.
Against this complex backdrop, several hotly debated issues with far 
more theological weight than the motion of  the Earth – and with explicit 
religious significance today – were not considered to be de fide at the time: 
the doctrine of  the Immaculate Conception; the question of  the action 
of  divine grace on the human disposition toward God (which lay at the 
heart of  the controversy De auxiliis between the Dominicans and the Jesu-
its, and which Paul V – on the advice of  Bellarmine – brought to an end in 
August 1607 by imposing the silence on the two parties); and one of  the 
most controversial issues in the history of  the early modern Church – the 
hierarchy of  power between the papacy and the council: indeed, this last 
fuelled a subterranean conflict between Rome and the French episcopacy 
that rumbled on until the dogma of  papal infallibility was declared in 1871.
In contrast, an implicit indulgence was perceptible in the Church’s at-
titude toward the theses in the De revolutionibus orbium coelestium. Coperni-
cus’ book, with its dedicatory letter to Paul III, had circulated for decades 
without opposition, even during the papacies of  the notoriously unbend-
ing Paul IV and Pius V. This detail did not escape the attentive eye of  Paolo 
Sarpi; in the advisory opinion that he prepared for the Venetian Senate re-
garding the censorship of  Copernicanism he wrote: «The suspension of  
the book cannot but have the effect of  causing amazement at the unprec-
edented act of  suspending an old book already seen by the entire world and 
never censored in the past, whether by the Council of  Trent or in Rome».34
In other words, Bellarmine’s letter to Foscarini advancing an extrajudi-
cial compromise – «It seems to me that Y[our] P[aternity] and Mr. Galileo 
would act wisely if  they content themselves with speaking ex suppositione, 
34 Paolo Sarpi, Sopra un decreto della congregazione in Roma in stampa presentato per 
l’illustrissimo signor conte del Zaffo a 5 maggio 1616. 7 maggio 1616, in Sarpi, Opere, ed. by G. and 
L. Cozzi, Milan-Naples, Ricciardi, 1969, pp. 602-605, 603.
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and not absolutely»  –  was hardly couched in the tones of  an authorita-
tive statement intended to settle a dangerously contentious issue. Indeed, 
it sounded weak and dilatory – «I will not believe that this evidence [of  the 
motion of  the Earth] exists, until it will be shown to me» –, betraying the 
absence of  a clear position on the matter within the Roman Curia.
At least this is how it was perceived by its addressees. Benedetto Castel-
li, writing to Galileo on May 6, regarded it as a victory for their side. Piero 
Dini noted a few days earlier that it represented «a point now gained, that 
is, the possibility to address issues as a mathematician, hypothetically», and 
on May 16 urged his friend to «wind up that piece of  writing [i.e. the Let-
ter to Christina] that you told me you have drafted», adding that «as for the 
letter of  the Carmelite Friar, Sir Prince [Cesi] tells me that soon it will be re-
printed with the addition of  further authorities, to have his interpretation 
made more clear».35 Indeed, Foscarini was even then working on a «full 
and exhaustive treatise in the Latin language» provided, Dini writes, with 
«many passages from the holy Fathers, whereby he strengthens himself».36
The feeling in Rome was that the informal intervention of  Bellar- 
mine had brought the issue to an honorable conclusion; on April 18 Cardi-
nal Barberini informed Dini that «I hear no more talk about the affairs of  
Mr. Galileo»; two days later an unnamed Jesuit Father also congratulated 
Dini that «Mr. Galileo’s affairs have been sorted».37 As we know, this per-
ception would be proved wrong in the following autumn, as the inquiry 
was resumed after the interrogation of  Ximenes and Attavanti. Galileo’s 
departure for Rome «to account for himself  concerning some charges, or 
rather calumnies» – as Cosimo II wrote in a letter recommending his math-
ematician to no less a personage than the Cardinal-nephew Scipione Bor-
ghese – marked the turning point of  the whole case.38
4. The literal meaning of the Scriptures
Galileo’s stay in Rome from December 1615 to June 1616 has been 
generally interpreted as a spontaneous move, implicitly falling in with the 
agreement that had been proposed by Bellarmine in the hope of  persuad-
35 Castelli to Galileo, 6 May 1615, OG, XII, pp. 177-178; Dini to Galileo, 2 May and 16 May 
1615, OG, XII, pp. 175-176, 181.
36 Cesi to Galileo, 20 June 1615, OG, XII, pp. 189-190.
37 Dini to Galileo, 18 April and 20 April 1615, OG, XII, pp. 173-175.
38 Cosimo II to Scipione Borghese, 2 December 1615, OG, XII, pp. 205-206.
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ing the Church authorities of  the veracity of  the heliocentric model by 
employing «the tongue instead of  the pen».39
Various clues suggest, however, that Galileo came to Rome at the 
specific request of  the Holy Office rather than voluntarily. In his corre-
spondence from that period he maintained the most rigorous discretion 
regarding the matters discussed at various meetings, as was the custom 
in inquisitorial proceedings; he wrote about his direct or indirect dealings 
with the cardinals of  the Holy Office («those most distinguished personali-
ties handling such matters»); he hints at discreet, albeit in-depth inquiries 
into his behavior and ideas («kind access and a hearing were granted me, 
and the freedom to reassure them as to my every act, saying, thought, 
opinion and teaching»).40
Again the most plausible hypothesis is that the tribunal on issues of  
faith was trying to find an extrajudicial solution to a case that had serious 
diplomatic implications, that had been reopened on the basis of  the contra-
dictory testimony of  two witnesses, and that was further fuelled in Rome 
by the charges of  certain «enemies», who can be identified as Caccini and, 
probably, the Dominican friars of  the Church of  the Minerva.
The concurrence in time between the interrogations of  Father Ximenes 
and Galileo’s student Attavanti and the initiation of  the inquiry in Rome 
is confirmed by some veiled references by Galileo to «so many and such 
grievous slanders» that have been brought against him by his accusers, who 
have «plotted against my reputation», and regarding which, nonetheless, he 
has managed to justify himself. It seems, therefore, that we are dealing with 
charges that were not based on written testimony, and it is not difficult to 
identify in such charges the alleged theses regarding the «substance» and 
the «senses» of  God that we find in the denunciations by Lorini and Caccini 
that led to the opening of  the inquiry.41
However, in the overall context I believe that it is important to underscore 
two details. The first detail is that this informal inquiry represented the first 
time that the pope’s inquisitors focused on both the theses of  Galileo – or 
those ascribed to him – and Copernicanism itself  as a cosmological theory:
39 Galileo to Dini, May 1615, OG, XII, pp. 183-185. See Heilbron, Galileo (cit. note 1), 
pp.  215 sq., Damanti, “Libertas philosophandi” (cit. note 1), pp.  107 sq., Fantoli, Galileo e la 
Chiesa (cit. note 1), p. 104, Camerota, Galileo Galilei (cit. note 1), pp. 303-304. Bucciantini, Con-
tro Galileo (cit. note 22), pp. 69 sq., on the contrary, is more inclined toward the hypothesis of  
a convocation of  Galileo. See Querenghi to Alessandro d’Este, 1 January 1616, OG, XII, p. 220.
40 See Galileo’s letters to Picchena, especially the ones of  8 January and 6 February 1616, 
OG, XII, pp. 222-223, 230-232.
41 Galileo to Picchena, 8 January 1616 (see above).
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I say to you – Galileo wrote to Picchena on February 6 – that my affair has 
been wholly concluded as for the part concerning my own person; [...] But [...] a 
charge is annexed to my cause, not concerning my own person, rather the entire 
whole of  those who have been or still are endorsing in printed works, or private 
writings, or in public demonstrations and lectures, or even in personal speeches 
a certain doctrine and opinion that is not unknown to Y[our] Most Illustrious 
L[ordship], the decision regarding which is presently being discussed.42
The Discorso del flusso e reflusso del mare (‘Discourse over the flow and 
reflow of  the sea’) written by Galileo in Rome and dedicated to his patron 
Cardinal Orsini, is dated 8 January 1616. Despite its (laconic) profession of  
hypotheticism («Taking, therefore, ex hypothesi the motion of  the Earth...»), 
the text is intended to prove the reality of  the Copernican system through 
the evidence of  the tides, so as to offer Bellarmine the «demonstration» of  
the Earth’s motion that the latter, however skeptically, had referred to in his 
letter to Foscarini.43
The Disputatio de situ et quiete terrae (‘Disputation on the place and im-
mobility of  the Earth’) by Francesco Ingoli, a prelate in the household of  
Cardinal Caetani, dates to these same weeks. As is well known, Ingoli was 
soon to be appointed by the Congregation of  the Index as the consultant 
charged with the task of  emending Copernicus’ text. The Disputatio is a 
short refutation of  heliocentrism, the drafting of  which was very likely 
entrusted to Ingoli by the Holy Office itself. It was founded upon argu-
menta mathematica, physica and theologica, and appears to be the first official 
statement of  the Church’s position with regard to Copernican cosmology 
(apart from the Dominican theologian Giovanni Maria Tolosani’s De coelo 
supremo immobili, a work which was written, however, some seventy years 
earlier).44 In other words, early in the year 1616 the Holy Office was begin-
ning to take a more direct interest in the Copernican theory, in its physical 
and astronomical perspectives, and in its doctrinal consequences.
The second detail relates to the fact that Galileo came to his confiden-
tial interrogations armed with documents that he presented to his inter-
locutors for examination. «I thank God – he wrote to Picchena after the 
42 Ibid., p. 230.
43 OG, V, pp. 377-395: 381. The importance of  this text is underscored by Damanti, “Liber-
tas philosophandi” (cit. note 1), pp. 109-110, albeit stressing too much, in my opinion, Galileo’s 
alleged hypotheticist approach.
44 Bucciantini, Contro Galileo (cit. note 22), pp.  84 sq. On Tolosani see Miguel Angel 
Granada, Giovanni Maria Tolosani e la prima reazione romana di fronte al De revolutionibus: la 
critica di Copernico nell’opuscolo De coelo et elementis, in Bucciantini – Torrini (eds.), La dif-
fusione del copernica nesimo in Italia 1543-1610, Florence, Olschki, 1997, pp. 11-35.
NATURE, FAITH AND THE JUDGE OF FAITH
— 75 —
conclusion of  the affair – that what I said has been always proved by me 
with writings, copies of  which are kept by myself». A few months later this 
fact was confirmed by Cardinal Del Monte, who assured the Grand Duke 
that «to his person [i.e. to Galileo] there is not the least flaw to be ascribed, 
and he will be able to answer for himself  and to refute the calumnies of  
his persecutors, since all that he has been requested to provide is proven by 
writings».45
Among those «writings» was perhaps the Discorso del flusso e reflusso del 
mare even if, in my opinion, this hypothesis is not highly plausible. It is 
more likely that Galileo included the Istoria e dimostrazioni intorno alle mac-
chie solari (‘History and demonstrations concerning sunspots’), which the 
Holy Office had in fact ordered to be examined in the very period coincid-
ing with Galileo’s departure for Rome.46 Almost certainly there would have 
been the letter to Castelli – which Monsignor Dini had been circulating on 
behalf  of  Galileo among certain cardinals of  the Holy Office – and the let-
ter to Christina of  Lorraine.
This means that very probably between December and January, before 
beginning an evaluation of  the Copernican system, the Holy Office carried 
out an informal inquiry on the suspect assertions ascribed to Galileo but 
then quickly clarified by him, and on the methodological principles laid 
out in his public letters: i.e., the Bible may sometimes speak inaccurately 
to settle the opinions of  uncultivated people; its exegetes may be subject 
to error; it has binding authority only in matters concerning faith; and that 
therefore on questions of  natural philosophy it is less trustworthy than 
mathematical and philosophical inferences.
As we know, these premises formed the foundation of  Galileo’s herme-
neutical proposal. They were described and discussed as such in the written 
denunciation sent to Rome by Lorini, as already seen at the beginning of  
this paper, and in Bellarmine’s letter to Foscarini. In other words they must 
be considered as the conceptual core around which the entire Galileo affair 
of  1615-1616 revolved.
Notwithstanding this, after the interrogation of  Galileo behind closed 
doors, those assertions did not become the object of  any formal censure, 
nor was he notified of  any obligation to renounce them. Indeed the con-
clusion of  the trial centered entirely upon the mathematical aspect of  the 
45 Galileo to Picchena, 26 March 1616, OG, XII, p. 251; Cardinal Del Monte to Cosimo II, 
4 June 1616, OG, XII, p. 264.
46 Processo a Galileo, OG, XIX, p. 320: «Die 25 9mbris 1615. Videantur quaedam litterae 
Gallilei, editae Romae cum inscriptione Delle macchie solari».
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heliocentric theory, which was judged to be false and contrary to Scripture. 
It was on this basis that Foscarini’s Lettera sopra l’opinione de’ Pittagorici was 
prohibited and the commentary on the Book of  Job by Diego de Zuñiga 
was sentenced to expurgation, since they now figured as attempts to har-
monize the letter of  the Bible with a condemned thesis.
In fact, the hermeneutical theses advanced by Galileo contained noth-
ing that was intrinsically incorrect. First, the idea that when disputing issues 
of  natural philosophy the Bible should not be contrasted with «the experi-
ences and reasons of  philosophy» (experimentis et rationibus philosophiae), to 
use the words of  Father Benito Pereyra – professor of  Sacred Scripture at 
the Roman College and one of  Galileo’s sources for documents in his own 
defense – was widely shared. It meant that on such issues the standard ar-
guments should be drawn from physics (Aristotelian physics, in Pereyra’s 
case) and the exegetes had to conform with them.
In his Commentarii et disputationes in Genesim (1591-99) Pereyra gives sev-
eral examples of  what he means. He mentions ancient authors who com-
mitted macroscopic errors concerning the structure of  the world and the 
universe; some of  these had traditionally been viewed with suspicion, like 
the early Christian theologians Origen and Lactantius, but there was also 
John Chrysostom, an influential Father of  the Church. Adhering strictly 
to the letter of  the Scriptures, they argued that the heavens are not spheri-
cal in shape, that they are motionless, and that the planets move freely 
through them «like fishes in the water, and birds through the air»; they also 
rejected the existence of  the antipodes and asserted that the level of  the 
oceans could exceed the highest mountain ranges. Statements like these, 
adds Pereyra, «now appear to be false, in the light of  evident experiences 
and necessary demonstrations».47
Obviously, I am not arguing that Pereyra anticipated Galilean physics; 
as shown by his rejection of  the free motion of  heavenly bodies, he re-
mained attached to the Ptolemaic vision of  the solidity of  the planetary 
spheres, a vision that had already been challenged in the late 16th century 
and that Bellarmine himself  dismissed in his Louvain lectures. Nonetheless, 
when arguing for the stability of  the Earth at the center of  the universe, 
Pereyra based his reasoning on the Aristotelian principle of  the heaviness 
47 Benito Pereyra, Commentarii et disputationes in Genesim, Lyon, ex officina Iuntarum, 
1594, I, p. 25. On Pereyra hermeneutical theses see Corrado Dollo, Galileo Galilei e la cultura 
della tradizione, ed. by G. Bentivegna, S. Burgio, G. Magnano San Lio, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbet-
tino, 2003, pp. 170 sq.; Remmert, “Sonne steh still über Gibeon” (cit. note 31), p. 550.
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of  this element, so contradicting the literalism of  Justin and the Second 
Epistle of  Peter which, following Ex. 20 and Ps. 24 [23] and 136 [135], had 
affirmed that the Earth was founded upon the waters. In the same way, 
when commenting on the two luminaria magna of  Gen. 1,16, he made it 
clear that the passage must be interpreted as referring to how these phe-
nomena commonly appeared to the senses, given that the Moon is actually 
much smaller than the Sun and all the other heavenly bodies, apart from 
Mercury.48 In other words, setting aside his loyalty to Ptolemaic cosmology 
and Aristotelian physics, what Pereyra was showing was a notable example 
of  an exegesis of  biblical passages based on philosophical and astronomical 
evidence.
So, from a hermeneutical perspective the adapting of  scriptural inter-
pretation to the findings of  natural philosophy was not in itself  subject 
to censorship, at least not in the early 17th century. A more rigid form of  
biblical literalism arose soon thereafter, especially under the tutelage of  
Cornelius a Lapide, who was appointed professor of  Sacred Scripture at 
the Roman College in 1616. While this literalism would blur over time in 
Catholic culture, it continued to influence the more orthodox strands of  
Lutheran and Calvinist scholarship.49
Secondly, it was acknowledged that the Bible could contain what at first 
sight might appear to be misleading sentences, that its text could some-
times be unclear or appear to indulge popular beliefs, and that therefore 
its exegetes were subject to errors of  interpretation. Indeed, this was the 
premise upon which the entire system of  Catholic controversialist theol-
ogy rested, since the uncertainty and obscurity of  the Biblical text justified 
the spiritual authority of  the Roman pontiff as the ultimate judge on con-
troversies over matters of  faith.
Bellarmine’s Disputationes de controversiis make the principle of  the 
pope’s authority clear at the very beginning, as they deal with the «inter-
pretation of  the Word of  God» in the chapter mentioned above (see above, 
note 33), reminding the reader that there are «countless sources of  diffi-
48 Pereyra, Commentarii (cit. note 47), I, pp.  56-57, 142-143. Bellarmine’s views on the 
fluidity of  the heavens have been highlighted and discussed by Baldini – George V. Coyne, 
The Louvain Lectures (Lectiones Lovanienses) of  Bellarmine and the Autograph Copy of  his 1616 
Declaration to Galileo, Vatican City, Specola Vaticana, 1984. Remmert, Im Zeichen des Konsenses. 
Bibelexegese und mathematische Wissenschaften in der Gesellschaft Jesu um 1600, «Zeitschrift für his-
torische Forschung», 33/1, 2006, pp. 33-66, 50 sq., mentions further Jesuit authors that stressed 
the importance of  philosophical and mathematical learning for the purpose of  a correct bibli-
cal exegesis, in particular José de Acosta, Jerónimo de Prado and Juan Bautista Villalpando.
49 François Laplanche, Herméneutique biblique et cosmologie mosaïque, in Olivier Fatio (ed.), 
Les Églises face aux sciences du Moyen Age au XXe siècle, Geneva, Droz, 1991, pp. 29-51, pp. 34 sq.
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culty» in the text, «words and expressions that are ambiguous», «imperfect», 
or «inappropriate», as well as «phrases that are unique to the Jews».50 An-
other influential theologian of  the Society of  Jesus, Father Jean Lorin (who 
succeeded Pereyra in the chair of  Sacred Scripture at the Roman College), 
when explaining the use of  the term firmamentum in the Vulgate to indicate 
the heavens of  the planets, resorted to the will of  Moses to «accommodate, 
when writing, the impressions of  the common people».51
Concord among authors and loyalty to Catholic tradition were of  
course a guarantee of  correct interpretation, but Bellarmine himself – a 
young man still at the beginning of  his teaching career – had overlooked 
that concord in his commentaries on the Prima of  Aquinas’ Summa theolo-
giae delivered in his Louvain lectures between 1570 and 1572. At the time, 
with reference to the story of  the Creation, he indeed resorted to Scripture 
to reject the theory of  the incorruptibility and inalterability of  the heavens 
posited by orthodox Aristotelians, as well as by Aquinas and «many scho-
lastic doctors».52
5. A hypothesis on the reasons behind Copernicus’ condemnation
Hence, if  we look at the case from a purely doctrinal perspective, it 
seems unlikely that the conditions for a condemnation of  Galileo’s her-
meneutical theses, as explicated in his letters to Castelli and Christina of  
Lorraine, were present. Instead, things change if  we adopt a historical 
perspective.
At that particular time, during the reign of  Paul V, those principles must 
have appeared extremely suspect to the Holy Office, and to the Roman 
Curia in general. First of  all, they were expounded in quite a singular form. 
50 I controversy De Verbo Dei, b. 3, ch. 1 (see above, n. 33), p. 65. On these passages see 
also Remmert, Im Zeichen des Konsenses (cit. note 48), pp. 40-41, who indicates comparable asser-
tions in the Prolegomena in sancta evangelia (1598) of  Father Alonso Salmerón, one of  the major 
experts in biblical exegesis of  the first Jesuit generation. On the correlation between biblical 
hermeneutics and the power structure within the Church see Laplanche, Bible, sciences et pou-
voirs au XVIIe siècle, Naples, Bibliopolis, 1997, pp. 24 sq.
51 Jean Lorin, Commentarii in librum Psalmorum, Venice, apud Iacobum Tomasinum, 
1737 (orig. 1612), p. 247 (in Ps 18 [19]). On Lorin see also Dollo, Galileo Galilei (cit. note 47), 
pp. 140-141.
52 The Louvain Lectures, An coelum natura sua sit corruptibile; An coelum de facto corrumpetur, 
pp. 9-11. Bellarmine deems also «more probable» the autonomous motion of  the stars than 
their fixity to the heavenly spheres, though adding that «if  there will ever come out an evidence 
[of  this latter theory] it will be necessary to correct the comprehension of  the Scripture, so that 
they will not conflict with a manifest truth»: ibid., p. 21.
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The statements about the pre-eminence of  the mathematical and physical 
sciences in the explanation of  natural phenomena, as well as the emphasis 
on the risks connected with a literalist exegesis of  the Bible, were set forth 
in Galileo’s writings as the foundations of  a precise and explicit hermeneu-
tical argumentation. On the contrary, the biblical commentaries of  Pereyra 
and Lorin were scholarly canonical works intended for the higher educa-
tion of  the clergy – and moreover their authors had already been subjected 
to the pre-emptive internal censorship of  the Society of  Jesus.
Secondly, over and above this, even more sensitive topics can be found in 
Galileo’s letters, especially in his letter to Christina; for instance, the appeal 
for libertas philosophandi, the ‘freedom to philosophize’, or the distinction 
that he made between «the debatable and the demonstrative disciplines», 
with the significant «great difference [...] between giving orders to a math-
ematician or a philosopher, and ruling over a merchant, or a lawyer».53 Even 
his continual references to Augustine could raise suspicions, since the con-
troversy De auxiliis had shown how difficult, if  not impossible, it was to 
bend this particular Church Father’s writings to the disciplinary demands 
and logic of  the scholastic theology embraced by the regular orders.
These topics must have been perceived as elements of  a possible new 
knowledge system that was exempt from and even a rival to the Church’s 
teachings, at least in the sphere of  biblical hermeneutics and with regard to 
the description of  natural phenomena.
At the time, the interpretation of  the Bible was the methodological 
framework within which not only the categories of  religious and moral 
discourse, but also the legitimacy of  the temporal and spiritual powers 
were elaborated. As such, in the first quarter of  the 17th century it was the 
sphere in which the harsh theological-political debate between the Roman 
Church and other ‘centers’ of  power such as the English monarchy and the 
Gallican Church unfolded.54
I believe that one of  the main reasons that led to the condemnation of  
Copernicanism by the Catholic Church can be identified if  we approach 
53 Galilei, Lettera a Cristina di Lorena sull’uso della Bibbia nelle argomentazioni scientifiche, 
ed. by F. Motta, Genoa, Marietti 1820, 2000, p. 114. I rely on this critical edition since, as is well 
known, the version of  the letter to Christina included in OG has been reconstructed by the 
editor, Antonio Favaro, by blending together texts taken from different witnesses. See also the 
more recent critical edition by Bucciantini – Camerota in Scienza e religione. Scritti copernicani, 
Rome, Donzelli, 2009, pp. 33-84.
54 According to Laplanche, La Bible en France entre mythe et critique. XVIe-XIXe siècle, Paris, 
Albin Michel, 1994, p. 13, in the decades between the Council of  Trent and the Thirty Years’ 
War the biblical issue emerged as the leading issue around which claims for truth and the use of  
violence were acted out: «De l’une et de l’autre, la solution est cherchée dans le Livre».
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the whole affair from this historical perspective. The hermeneutical theo-
ries delineated in Galileo’s writings, as I noted before, were scarcely cen-
surable in themselves, if  viewed as abstract proposals of  methodology, but 
their significance changed if  they were seen as the premises for substantial, 
unorthodox conclusions. In such cases, an exegesis of  the Bible aimed at 
legitimating assertions contrary to the official doctrine would have been 
wholly unacceptable. The same distinction between issues that were de fide 
and adiaphoric ones would have made no sense, since such issues, if  judged 
to be in conflict with the sources of  faith (Scripture and tradition), would 
have been considered as pertaining to faith.
This is exactly what happened to Copernicus’ heliocentric theory. 
Having ascertained Galileo’s «candidness and integrity» in early February, 
the supreme tribunal of  faith moved on to the examination of  «a certain 
doctrine and opinion [...], the resolution concerning which is now under 
discussion».55 On February 19 a brief  description of  the Copernican sys-
tem – based, as I noted above, on two sentences extracted from Caccini’s 
denunciation  –  was distributed to the consultants of  the Holy Office; a 
copy of  Ingoli’s Disputatio was probably made available to them as well.
That the two sentences submitted to the censors lacked any astronomi-
cal or theological contextualization appears to be in line with inquisitorial 
practice. This ordinarily involved the extrapolation of  particular sentences 
from the text under examination using an analytical method in which such 
sentences might not even be direct citations from the text, but paraphrases 
deemed to represent its theses. The most well known case is that of  the 
five propositions ascribed to the Augustinus of  Cornelius Jansen and con-
demned by Pope Innocent X with the bull Cum occasione in 1653, which 
sparked the huge Jansenist controversy.56
The unanimous judgment of  the consultants on Copernicanism was 
recorded on paper in a meeting held on 24 February 1616. Heliocentrism 
was evaluated not only from a theological, but also from a philosophical 
point of  view, a fact that might appear surprising at first glance since pro-
fane knowledge did not pertain, strictly speaking, to the jurisdiction of  the 
Holy Office. However, it reflects the increasing focus of  Church censorship 
on natural philosophy in the late 16th century (as evidenced by the inclu-
sion of  Telesio and Patrizi in the Index), based on the principle of  a concor-
dance between truths of  reason and truths of  faith proclaimed in the bull 
55 Galileo to Picchena, 6 February 1616 (as in note 40).
56 Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 8/1, pp. 474-496 ( J. Carrèire). Neveu, L’erreur et son 
juge (cit. note 9), pp. 512 sq.
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Apostolici regimini (1513) of  the Fifth Lateran Council.57 In any event, the 
double judgment issued in 1616 effectively blocked the possibility that the 
heliocentric theory, now defined as being contrary to Scripture, could be 
considered as compliant with philosophical truth.
The assertion that the Sun is the center of  the universe and does not 
orbit around the Earth was defined as «foolish and absurd in philosophy» 
and from a theological viewpoint «formally heretical»; the theory of  the 
motion of  the Earth received the same censure on philosophical grounds, 
while theologically it was judged to be «erroneous», that is, just one degree 
below heresy in the scale of  deviation from orthodoxy.58
The document was signed by eleven theologians of  the Congregation, 
among them the commissioner of  the Holy Office, Seghizzi, and Father 
Benedetto Giustiniani of  the Society of  Jesus, the same priest who, when 
entrusted some twenty years earlier with the examination of  Francesco 
Patrizi’s Nova de universis philosophia, did not raise any objections to the au-
thor’s thesis of  a daily rotation of  the Earth in a geocentric system.59 Gius-
tiniani also served as rector of  the Roman College between 1599 and 1602, 
and in 1607 actively participated in the debate over the Venetian Interdict, 
writing two pamphlets, one of  them a defense of  Bellarmine’s statements 
on the jurisdictional privileges of  the Church against the attacks of  the 
theologians of  the Republic.60
As for Galileo, the inquiry closed as it began, quite informally. He was 
privately informed by Bellarmine on behalf  of  the pope of  the Holy Of-
fice’s censorship of  the heliocentric theory – as ostensibly decided on Feb-
ruary 25 by the congregation in a plenary session, but of  which, as far as 
we know, no memorandum exists –, with the warning to «abandon it». If  
he refused, then any further research on, or the teaching or defense of  he-
liocentric ideas would be prohibited.61
57 As Maria Pia Donato remarks, the Apostolici regiminis «acted as the ideological and 
juridical framework of  theological censorship against philosophical-scientific thought in the 
early modern age» (Scienze della natura, in Dizionario storico dell’Inquisizione, III, pp. 1394-1398, 
1394).
58 Processo a Galileo, OG, XIX, pp. 320-321.
59 Lerner, L’hérésie heliocentrique (cit. note 13), p. 77.
60 Diccionario histórico de la Compañía de Jesús, II, p.  1740 ( J.P. Donnelly). It is worth 
reminding at least two other prestigious members of  the commission: the Augustinian 
Gregório Nuñez Coronel, former preacher to the Duke of  Savoy and secretary of  the De 
auxiliis commission, and the Dominican Tomás de Lemos, himself  involved in the proceed-
ings of  the De auxiliis as attorney of  his own order. S. Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, III, 
p. 61, and VI, p. 942.
61 Processo a Galileo, OG, XIX, p. 321.
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The story of  the relationship between Galilean thought and the Bible, 
with its remarkably modern ring, ends here; the works that followed did 
not touch upon topics of  biblical hermeneutics. The publishing history of  
the letter to Christina of  Lorraine unfolded entirely within the world of  
the Reformation and of  Catholic anti-Roman dissent, f rom the Latin trans-
lation published in Strasbourg in 1636 by Elia Diodati (Nov-antiqua sanc-
tissimorum Patrum, ac probatorum theologorum doctrina de Sacrae Scripturae 
testimoniis in conclusionibus mere naturalibus) to the Italian edition printed 
secretly in Naples by Lorenzo Ciccarelli in 1710.62
From this perspective the extrajudicial solution chosen by the Holy Of-
fice, probably on the suggestion of  Cardinal Bellarmine, proved to be effec-
tive: Galileo was silenced with regard to his hermeneutical proposals, but 
the official mathematician and philosopher of  the Grand Duke of  Tuscany 
was saved from any possible judicial consequences. The attempt to legiti-
mize a heliocentric scriptural exegesis was forestalled with the prohibition 
of  Foscarini’s Lettera. This was, so to speak, a pre-emptive use of  doctrinal 
censorship, whose effect was to avert the possible opening up of  an area of  
uncertainty on such a thorny issue as the monopoly over the interpretation 
of  the Bible and Catholic tradition.
As we know, the fate of  Copernicus’ work was somewhat different from 
that envisaged by the consultants to the Holy Office. The concise memoran-
dum of  the session of  the Index held on March 1st in Bellarmine’s residence 
hints of  a prolonged debate in which some cardinals of  the Congregation 
managed to change the accusation of  formal heresy against heliocentrism 
to the more vague charge of  ‘falsity’ and ‘opposition to Scripture’. Accord-
ingly, Copernicus’ De revolutionibus was not prohibited, but suspended until 
it could be ‘corrected’ – a provision that would have been regarded as far too 
mild for a book written by a heresiarch, as Copernicus was in all respects 
after the judgment handed down by the consultants of  the Inquisition. The 
corrected version, as we know, was prepared with surprising rapidity; the 
decree of  emendation, which adopted the proposals advanced by Ingoli, to 
whom the question had been entrusted, dates to May 1620.63
As I noted above, this revision to the doctrinal censure of  the heliocen-
tric theory was ascribed at the time to the intervention of  Cardinal Caetani 
and Cardinal Barberini (although it is possible that pressure had also been 
62 Motta, Nota al testo, in Lettera a Cristina di Lorena sull’uso della Bibbia (cit. note 53), 
pp. 67-80.
63 Pierre-Noël Mayaud, La condamnation des livres coperniciens et sa révocation à la lumière 
de documents inédits des Congrégations de l’Index et de l’Inquisition, Rome, Editrice Pontificia Uni-
versità Gregoriana, 1997, pp. 37-42, 69-71, 77-79.
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applied by Cardinal Orsini on Paul V).64 This decision was taken during a 
session of  the Index, and therefore not under the authority of  the Congre-
gation of  the Holy Office, which was formally responsible for decisions 
concerning the nature of  a suspect proposition. The Congregation, how-
ever, took official note of  the change in a session held on March 3 coram 
Sanctissimo ‘in the presence of  the Most Holy’, that is, the pope himself.65 
The decree of  the Index, dated 5 March 1616, made public the text of  the 
condemnation drafted four days earlier, whereby the «Pythagorean doc-
trine» was declared falsa and Sacrae Scripturae adversans.
Diplomatic considerations must have provided the main reason for 
such a change of  opinion, with the evident wish to avoid giving offence 
to the Grand Duke.66 Perhaps it is no coincidence that on February 13 the 
Cardinal-nephew Scipione Borghese wrote to Cosimo II personally to as-
sure him that special consideration would be accorded to Galileo. The sci-
entist himself, writing to the Florentine Secretary of  State in the aftermath 
of  the censure decree, referred  –  not without reason, although his tone 
perhaps betrayed an excessive degree of  optimism – to a danger that had 
finally been averted, since the Church had dismissed the accusation that 
the heliocentric theory was «against the faith and heretical», merely declar-
ing that «such opinion does not agree with the Sacred Scripture».67 All the 
same, the real significance of  the fact that the grave accusation of  heresy 
and error hovered over the thesis of  heliocentrism – even if  for just a few 
days – still must be assessed.
In introducing my assessments, I would like to make it clear that I do 
not wish to re-open the question concerning the doctrinal notes relating to 
Copernicus issued by the consultants to the Congregation of  the Inquisi-
tion, i.e. whether the notion of  heresy they applied had a dogmatic or a 
mere technical nature – a question that primarily touches on the ‘second 
trial’ of  Galileo and his condemnation in 1633, rather than on the 1615-
1616 affair.
64 See above, note 24. In a memory written during his own pontificate, and preserved in 
the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Barb. Lat. 4900, Maffeo Barberini reminds that the solu-
tion had been approved by Bellarmine: Francesco Beretta, Urbain VIII Barberini protagoniste 
de la condamnation de Galilée, in José Montesinos – Carlos Solís (eds.), Largo campo di filosofare, 
Eurosymposium Galileo 2001, La Orotava, Fundación canaria orotava de historia de la ciencia, 
2001, pp. 549-574, 557, note 37.
65 Processo a Galileo, OG, XIX, p. 278.
66 Camerota, Galileo Galilei (cit. note 1), pp. 320-321.
67 Galileo to Curzio Picchena, 6 March 1616, OG, XII, pp. 243-245.
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As is well known, the need to distinguish between a ‘theological’ and an 
‘inquisitorial’ heresy was introduced in Galilean historiography more than 
a century ago – although with very little critical reaction at the time – by 
the abbé Léon Garzend with his weighty treatise L’Inquisition et l’héresie 
(1912), which was recently brought back to the attention of  historians by 
Bruno Neveu during the first conference on the history of  the Holy Of-
fice held in Vatican City in 2003.68 Since then we have had the stimulating 
considerations of  Francesco Beretta, who points out that the abjuration by 
Galileo in 1633 was an act endowed with intrinsic magisterial value by the 
Holy See, and the equally well documented reappraisals by Neveu and by 
Father Pierre-Noël Mayaud.69
For my part, I believe that the idea of  enclosing the complex and often 
contradictory facts of  historical dynamics within the abstract categories of  
theology and canon law is always unsafe, particularly when dealing with 
the governing mechanisms of  the Old Regime, with its juridical instru-
ments, political concerns, and the will of  those in positions of  power per-
petually intertwining without actual discontinuity.
6. Heresy as a mirror of Church authority
What I would like to underscore here is just one among the many pos-
sible interpretations of  the historical, and especially the theological-politi-
cal reasons – meaning by this term the permanent and reciprocal mirroring 
between theology and politics that formed the background against which 
the Christian confessions and the temporal powers of  the time maneu-
vered  –  that led the Roman Church to censure Copernicanism in 1616, 
even coming close to condemning it outright as heresy.
If  we turn back to the theological categories envisaged by Melchor 
Cano, we can see how the two higher degrees of  deviance from orthodox 
faith are described in great detail. Basing himself  on the writings of  the 
eminent theologians Thomas Aquinas and Cardinal Cajetan, Cano insisted 
68 Neveu, Y a-t-il une hérésie inquisitoriale?, in Agostino Borromeo (ed.), L’Inquisizione. Atti 
del Simposio internazionale, Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2003, pp. 469-491.
69 Beretta, Le procès de Galilée et les archives du Saint-Office. Aspects judiciaires et théologiques 
d’une condamnation célèbre, «Révue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques», 83, 1999, 
pp. 441-490; Neveu – Mayaud, L’affaire Galilée et la tentation inflationniste. À propos des notions 
d’hérésie et de magistère impliquées dans l’affaire, «Gregorianum», 83/2, 2002, pp.  287-311; Be-
retta, L’affaire Galilée et l’impasse apologétique. Réponse à une censure, «Gregorianum», 84/1, 2003, 
169-192; Neveu – Mayaud, Impasse apologétique ou tentation inflationniste? À propos de l’affaire 
Galilée, «Archivum historiae pontificiae», 42, 2004, pp. 205-209.
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that no heresy can be established in the absence of  the violation of  an ar-
ticle of  faith proclaimed as such by the Church:
As long as a question is uncertain, and the Church has not spoken yet in fa-
vour of  one of  the two parties in a controversy, there is no judgment about the 
concordance of  one opinion or the other with Catholic faith. We can understand 
from this that there does not exist any heresy unless someone takes a position 
against a Catholic truth that the Church has prescribed with certainty. We must 
add to this that it is very far in itself  f rom the name of  Catholic truth, that some-
one calls Catholic truth [a doctrine] that is shared by everyone as a probable opin-
ion, but that neither the Church has ever requested to be believed nor the faithful 
believe out of  instilled faith.70
Cano ascribed the quality of  erroneousness to three different kinds of  
statements. The first is the class of  sentences that «shake», but «do not over-
turn» faith, since they oppose «Catholic and universal truths in which the 
universal Church believes» but that are not truths of  faith; for example, that 
the mendicant orders must live on charity rather than manual labor is true, 
but is not a matter of  faith. The second class of  statement includes prop-
ositions that contradict «a truth that, according to the strong [vehemens] 
conviction of  the experts, is a truth of  faith, despite it not having yet been 
declared as such by the Church nor proved with indisputable arguments». 
Finally, a third class of  erroneous statement regards a proposition «that is 
certainly in opposition to Catholic faith, although not in a manifest way, 
but rather on the basis of  the very probable and nearly necessary opinion 
of  all the experts».71
We may note that on the basis of  this theological taxonomy a charge of  
heresy against the heliocentric cosmology would have required as a neces-
sary precondition the clear acknowledgment of  Geocentrism as a revealed 
truth by the Church, a pronouncement that historically had never been 
made. Instead Cano’s second, more flexible designation of  erroneousness 
would seem to apply to this issue, referring to theses that may contradict 
a truth of  faith that has not yet been officially proclaimed as such but is 
believed to be true with a high degree of  certainty by expert theologians. 
And yet, in this case as well the fact remains that neither a council nor the 
Cathedra Petri, the teaching of  the Bishop of  Rome, had ever explicitly ad-
70 Cano, Locorum theologicorum libri XII (cit. note 10), p. 370.
71 Ibid., p. 388. A detailed account on the discussion of  the notes of  error and heresy by 
the other prominent theologians of  Spanish scholasticism, such as Domingo de Soto, Bar-




dressed the problem, nor had any clear and firm opinion been issued by 
scholarly theologians regarding whether Geocentrism was a truth of  faith. 
It was not by chance that Diego de Zuñiga’s Commentarii passed unscathed 
the examination of  the Suprema, the Spanish Inquisition, when they were 
first published in 1584 (and were eventually reprinted without any changes 
in Rome in 1591).72
Now, I consider it to be worth emphasizing that, at the time of  the 
first informal ‘trial’ of  Galileo, the theological tradition of  which Melchor 
Cano was a representative – and, with him, other outstanding authors of  
mid-16th-century Spanish scholasticism such as Domingo de Soto, and the 
teacher of  both Cano and de Soto, Francisco de Vitoria – had been progres-
sively weakened by the competition of  other elements. Most important 
among those was the process of  centralization of  the governing powers 
of  the Church in the hands of  the papacy, a process that had been accom-
plished not only in the institutional sphere with the reform of  the Roman 
congregations by Sixtus V and the diplomatic efforts to implement the Tri-
dentine decrees throughout Catholic Europe, but also on a strictly doc-
trinal level with the production of  a rich corpus of  theological treatises, 
written primarily by Jesuits who had been educated at the Roman College 
or one of  the Order’s other centers of  higher education, like its colleges 
in Ingolstadt and Cologne. The aim of  these theologians was to construct 
a full model of  Church authority based on the papal office of  iudex fidei, 
‘judge of  the faith’.
In this corpus of  works – made up variously of  pamphlets, treatises of  
controversialist theology, and commentaries on the Summa theologiae – the 
exclusive privilege of  the Apostolic See to define dogma was emphasized 
within the framework of  a Church model in which the Pope’s spiritual sov-
ereignty over the Christian world found legitimacy in his prerogative as the 
ultimate judge in cases of  faith. This argument identified in the Chair of  
Saint Peter the superordinate source of  doctrine, since the Roman pontiff 
and the bodies appointed by him, such as the Holy Office and the Index, 
summarized the functions of  dogmatic legislation – properly the domain 
of  the Council – with the instruments of  doctrinal censorship.
From this perspective censorship operated as a tool of  legitimization 
and as an expression of  the spiritual sovereignty of  the papacy, hence as 
an instrument of  political action, assessed and administered on a case by 
case basis, sometimes even to the detriment of  the stringent logics formally 
envisaged by canon law.
72 Mayaud, La condamnation des livres coperniciens (cit. note 63), p. 44.
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This sort of  practice was lucidly denounced by Sarpi in one of  the most 
significant of  the reports that he prepared for the Venetian Senate, dating 
to February 1609. Here the theologian pointed out the gap that formed 
during the Interdict between the doctrinal censures issued by the Roman 
Curia and their actual consequences. According to Sarpi, Roman censures 
were often wanting in doctrinal substance and appeared to reflect political 
pressures above all else:
[In Rome] they are well aware that the doctrine [of  Venice] is well established 
in divine Scripture, in the canons of  the universal Church, in the laws of  the Em-
pire and of  other Catholic kingdoms, and in the writings of  the Holy Fathers. For 
that reason, they deem it necessary to escape the objections that may be raised 
against them with such powerful weapons, so they talk in generalities and assert 
that [this doctrine] contains reckless, slanderous, heretical, erroneous, and scan-
dalous things, respectively. With those names they frighten the world, and, not 
specifying further details, they don’t give anyone the opportunity to protest.73
Cano had served as the official theologian representing the emperor 
Charles V at the Council of  Trent in 1551-1552. His Loci theologici were con-
ceived as a response to the need of  the controversialists to reshape the meth-
ods of  theology in the aftermath of  the council’s asserted hierarchy of  the 
sources of  faith. From a historical perspective he shared – together with the 
other authors of  the School of  Salamanca – the vision of  a balance of  pow-
ers in the Church that acknowledged the primacy of  the Roman See within a 
framework of  harmony with the council and the main theological faculties.
At the turn of  the century, in the intense and decisive years that wit-
nessed the absolution of  Henry IV, the death of  Philip II, and the crowning 
of  James I in England, the historical context had decisively changed. From 
this perspective, at that time the ecclesiological concepts of  the School of  
Salamanca, although still central in the system of  higher education of  the 
clergy in the late 16th century, were no longer the prevailing standard – at 
least not in Rome.
One example of  this may be found in the controversy over grace, where 
the Spanish Dominicans (who referred to themselves as thomistae, ‘followers 
73 Consulto 50, Scrittura in diffesa delle opere scritte a favore della Serenissima Repubblica nella 
controversia col Sommo pontefice, February 25, 1609, in Sarpi, Consulti, I/1, I Consulti dell’Interdetto 
(1606-1607), ed. by C. Pin, Pisa-Rome, Istituti editoriali e poligrafici internazionali, 2001, 
pp. 672-695, 677-678. On the different perspectives of  the jurisdictional conflict between Rome 
and Venice, see Frajese, Sarpi scettico. Stato e Chiesa a Venezia tra Cinque e Seicento, Bologna, il 
Mulino, 1994, pp. 383 sq., and the studies collected in Marie Viallon (ed.), Paolo Sarpi. Politique 
et religion en Europe, Paris, Garnier, 2010, pp. 28-54.
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of  Thomas Aquinas’) – represented first and foremost by Domingo Bañez, 
a pupil and then a colleague of  Cano – failed to obtain the condemnation 
of  the Molinist theses upheld by the Society of  Jesus, which were stigma-
tized as ‘new’ and ‘Pelagian’ by the majority of  observers at the time. It 
must also be remembered that in the summer of  1601 Clement VIII sought 
to resolve the controversy himself, based on his papal authority and his 
prerogative of  iudex fidei. This effort to define the correct thesis regarding 
the relationship between human will and divine grace on the basis of  the 
vast amount of  Augustinian sources available and the endless paperwork 
produced by the De auxiliis commission eventually came to nothing with 
the death of  the pope, but it provides nonetheless a significant example of  
the doctrinal power claimed by the Chair of  Saint Peter.
It is worth adding that on this particular issue Cardinal Bellarmine, the 
leading theorist on the question of  the spiritual sovereignty of  the pope, 
had cautioned Clement VIII against the solution of  acting by himself  in-
voking his role of  iudex fidei, even submitting an opinion suggesting that a 
council be convened to settle the question, in a remarkable reversal of  roles 
that tells us a great deal about the insufficiency of  a purely doctrinal read-
ing of  the intertwining tendencies within the Roman Curia.74
7. The Jesuits and the judge of controversies
There is now a vast bibliography available on the role played by the 
Society of  Jesus in the events that culminated in the censures of  1616 and, 
more generally, their contribution to the germination of  experimental sci-
ence. In particular, a unique feature of  Jesuit culture that has been identi-
fied by historians of  early modern science is their longstanding, steadfast 
effort to transplant observational and experimental practices into the soil 
of  Aristotelian epistemology.75
74 Motta, Bellarmino (cit. note 14), pp. 582 sq.
75 Among the many titles, see Rivka Feldhay, Galileo and the Church. Political Inquisition or 
Critical Dialogue, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 203; Id., The Jesuits. Transmit-
ters of  the New Science, in Bucciantini – Camerota – Franco Giudice (eds.), Il caso Galileo. Una 
rilettura storica, filosofica, teologica, Florence, Olschki, 2011, pp. 47-74; Richard J. Blackwell, 
Galileo, Bellarmine, and the Bible. Including a Translation of  Foscarini’s Letter on the Motion of  the 
Earth, Notre Dame, University of  Notre Dame Press, 1991, pp. 135 sq.; Kelter, The Refusal to 
Accommodate (cit. note 31); Michael J. Gorman, Molinist Theology and Natural Knowledge in the 
Society of  Jesus 1580-1610, in Sciences et religions de Copernic à Galilée (cit. note 13), pp. 235-254. A 
detailed bibliographical essay in Sheila J. Rabin, Early Modern Jesuit Science. A Historiographical 
Essay, «Journal of  Jesuit Studies», 1, 2014, pp. 88-104.
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Regarding the question under discussion here, I feel that it is important 
to highlight another aspect of  the historical identity and role of  the Jesuits 
in this period – an aspect forged by political conflict, first and foremost the 
design which they championed of  affirming the unlimited sovereignty of  
the pontiff over the individual consciences of  believers.
The decades between the last quarter of  the 16th century and the out-
break of  the Thirty Years War witnessed the height of  religious conflict in 
Europe and the momentum of  the theological-political developments of  
the early modern period. At that time the Jesuits underwent a fundamental 
process which – in the eyes of  their enemies – reshaped their identity from 
that of  an essentially Hispanic order to a multifaceted body devoted to the 
establishment of  papal tyranny.76
Expelled from France in 1594 after the attempted murder of  Henry 
IV by a former Jesuit student, Jean Chastel; expelled from Venice in 1606 
during the Interdict; expelled from Bohemia in the aftermath of  the in-
surrection against Hapsburg rule, the Jesuits were perceived as a powerful 
presence dominating the area where the civil and the religious spheres, the 
temporal and spiritual powers, intersected. In this period Jesuit hegemony 
over the consciences of  the princes of  the Ancien Régime gained momen-
tum, with many powerful Catholic rulers from the dukes of  Bavaria and 
Savoy to Henry of  France and the imperial dynasty choosing Jesuit priests 
as their spiritual advisors, f rom Johannes Buslidius to Guillaume Lamor-
maini, and Pierre Coton, the most renowned and most detested of  them 
all.77
The ideal model of  the court confessor was outlined by Bellarmine in 
one of  the devotional booklets that he produced during the latter part of  
his life, the De officio principis christiani of  1619. The confessor should not 
be intimidated by the majesty of  his penitent, but he rather sounds out his 
conscience with even greater religious zeal and devotion, since the private 
sins of  the man could pollute the public person of  the sovereign. The Jesuit 
confessor embodied the hierarchical relationship between the temporal 
76 Eric Nelson, The Jesuit legend: superstition and myth-making, in Helen Parish – William 
G. Naphy (eds.), Religion and Superstition in Reformation Europe, Manchester-New York, Man-
chester University Press, 2002, pp. 94-115, 109 sq.; José Martínez Millán, La trasformazione del-
la monarchia hispana alla fine del XVI secolo. Dal modello cattolico castigliano al paradigma universale 
cattolico-romano, in Paolo Broggio – Francesca Cantù – Pierre-Antoine Fabre – Antonella 
Romano (eds.), I gesuiti ai tempi di Claudio Acquaviva. Strategie politiche, religiose e culturali tra 
Cinque e Seicento, Brescia, Morcelliana, 2007, pp. 19-53.
77 Robert Bireley, The Jesuits and the Thirty Yeas War. Kings, Courts, and Confessors, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003; Harro Höpfl, Jesuit Political Thought. The Society of  
Jesus and the State, c. 1540-1630, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 20 sq.
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and sacred powers: he remained seated wearing his biretta while hearing 
the confession, while the prince was on his knees, bareheaded.78
This hierarchical relationship between the director of  conscience and 
the sovereign quoad peccata, with regard to sins and their absolution, was 
in a sense the iconic representation of  the relationship between spiritual 
and temporal power outlined in Bellarmine’s theory of  the indirect power 
of  the pope. According to Bellarmine, as is well known, the prerogative 
of  judging and sanctioning the acts of  rule of  a prince fell to the Roman 
See. This comprised acts pertaining to temporal issues if  they affected the 
preservation of  faith (one textbook case was the granting of  freedom of  
worship to heretic subjects) and even, if  necessary, the excommunication 
of  an errant sovereign and the absolution of  his subjects from their bonds 
of  fealty.
The fact that the bond of  obedience between subjects and their prince 
could be broken by excommunication as an act that separated an individual 
from the community of  Christians (an act that was not without precedent, 
going back to Gregory VII’s excommunication of  Henry IV in 1076), as op-
posed to considering this bond to be fixed and indissoluble because it is a 
tie of  nature to the paternal authority of  one’s sovereign, as established by 
God at the Creation (the declared position of  the English king, James I, and 
of  the French Parliaments) constituted one of  the most controversial issues 
in the political debate across Europe in those years.
What appears interesting to me is that we have here two diverging the-
ories regarding the social pact, one identifying a juridical-political sphere 
ruled by its own laws stemming from nature and hence not constrained 
by spiritual power, and the other denying that the sphere of  secular power 
was exempt from religious authority, based on the priority of  faith and of  
the Catholic Church.
To a certain extent an analogy can be drawn between this struggle for 
authority between the Church and the secular powers and the emerging 
confrontation between the Church and experimental science, between the 
hermeneutics of  the Letter to Christina, with its notion of  the autonomous 
jurisdiction of  natural philosophy, and the hermeneutics of  the theologians 
of  the Holy Office, who designated the Copernican theory as false, errone-
ous and heretical.79 It must be noted that in both cases the Apostolic See 
78 Nicole Reinhardt, Voices of  Conscience. Royal Confessors and Political Counsel in Seven-
teenth-Century Spain and France, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 67 sq.
79 Analogous considerations can be found in Volker Reinhardt, Il concilio di Trento e le sci-
enze naturali: la controversia fra Bellarmino e Galilei come paradigma, in Paolo Prodi – Wolfgang 
Reinhard (eds.), Il concilio di Trento e il moderno, Bologna, il Mulino, 1996, pp. 485-501.
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exercised its powers with recourse to an act of  judgment, be it with regard 
to the conscience of  the prince or to the lawfulness of  heliocentrism.
After the failed attempt by Sixtus V to have Bellarmine’s Disputationes 
placed on the Index in 1590 because of  his rebuttal of  the idea of  an im-
mediate papal dominance over the kingdoms of  the earth, the theory of  
the indirect power of  the pope on temporal issues, though never explicitly 
recognized as dogma, became the pillar of  the theological system substan-
tiating the hegemonic strategies of  the Roman Church. It is against this 
theory, as we will see below, that in 1606 James I forced the suspect Recus-
ants to take an oath of  allegiance to the English Crown and in the same 
year Paolo Sarpi sought to develop a full-fledged theory of  the State in op-
position to the political views of  Jesuit scholasticism.80
According to Sarpi, the claim of  the totato – the all-encompassing au-
thority of  the Apostolic See, in his sarcastic words – was to raise to the 
level of  dogma theological concepts that were actually devoid of  any real 
foundation in Scripture and ancient tradition, concepts that had emerged 
over time with the evolution of  the Church. «The imposition of  the right 
to license or to block from kingship, to appoint, or to remove kings – Sarpi 
wrote in the above-mentioned account  –  is something that has been at-
tempted for five hundred years, and it has never had success or been put 
into execution».81 Later Sarpi wrote to the Gallican magistrate Jacques Les-
chassier: «Bellarmine condemns [our opinions] as heretical, and establishes 
as an article of  faith that the pope can excommunicate kings and release 
subjects from their oath, and he unceasingly argues [...] that the excom-
municated, as long as they remain such, cannot be given any obedience 
without committing a sin».82
In his political considerations the Servite friar and theologian Fulgenzio 
Micanzio, another well-known correspondent of  Galileo (and biographer 
of  Sarpi), grasped the enormity of  the theory of  indirect power: «Even eat-
ing, drinking, sleeping and everything must be subordinated to the spiritual 
end and salvation; therefore [the Apostolic See] has authority over every-
thing»; and furthermore: «Every habit that is not directed toward God’s 
glory and toward salvation is an abuse, hence all things, none excepted, 
would fall under the authority of  the ecclesiastical court».83
80 This is opportunely noted by Corrado Vivanti, I due governi del mondo negli scritti di 
Sarpi, in Viallon (ed.), Paolo Sarpi. Politique et religion en Europe (cit. note 73), pp. 28-54.
81 Consulto 50, p. 680.
82 22 December 1609, in Sarpi, Lettere ai gallicani, ed. by B. Ulianich, Wiesbaden, Franz 
Steiner, 1961, pp. 61-66: 64.
83 Fulgenzio Micanzio, Annotazioni e pensieri, in Gino Benzoni – Tiziano Zanato (eds.), 
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In 1616 consultors and cardinals of  the Index and the Holy Office did 
indeed resolve that the theory of  the motion of  the Earth and the stillness 
of  the Sun was «subject to the authority of  the ecclesiastical court» since 
it conflicted with the Biblical image of  the universe which, though never 
doctrinally codified, was implicitly received by tradition. The same could 
be said about the hierarchy of  the spiritual and temporal powers, which 
was never recognized as dogma by a council nor did it even formally re-
ceive the consensus of  scholastic theologians, but which had been firmly 
and unwaveringly upheld by the acts of  a long sequence of  popes from 
Gregory VII to Pius V and also, it must be said, had clearly been envisaged 
as a thesis by Aquinas.84
The point is that explicit recourse to the potestas indirecta  – notwith-
standing the opposition of  a widespread, resolutely anti-Roman wing of  the 
Catholic Church – was supported by a vast amount of  apologetic scholar-
ship centered around controversialist theology, with the theory of  the pope 
as iudex controversiarum, ‘judge of  controversies in the realm of  faith’, as the 
conceptual foundation for his indirect power. Not by chance, the central 
thesis of  the most renowned and disputed of  Bellarmine’s Controversiae, 
concerning the spiritual power of  the pope, was argumented as – much 
of  it word for word – a long annotation entitled De iudice controversiarum 
disputatio (‘Disputation on the judge of  controversies’), written by him in 
the margin of  his lecture on Aquinas’ Secunda secundae that was delivered 
in Louvain in 1574.85
In the area of  controversialist theology, during the decades under con-
sideration here, the Jesuits – who were far more prepared, due to their rig-
orous education and scholarship, than the members of  other orders for the 
debate with Protestants and with the advocates of  State authority – were 
the architects of  the pope’s sovereignty based on his position as the highest 
judge in matters of  faith.
The polemical works of  the greatest authorities on controversialist 
matters in the Society of  Jesus – such as Martin Becanus, Adam Tanner, 
Grégorio de Valencia, Edmund Campion, and François Veron, who were 
active primarily along the confessional border between Catholic and Re-
formed Europe, i.e., in Germany, the Low Countries, and the Austrian He-
Storici e politici veneti del Cinquecento e del Seicento, Milan-Naples, Ricciardi, 1982, pp. 733-863: 
760, 761.
84 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Th. II-II, q. 12, De apostasia, a. 2, Utrum princeps, propter apos-
tasiam a fide, amittat dominium in subditos, ita quod ei obedire non teneantur.
85 Motta, Bellarmino (cit. note 14), pp. 363 sq.
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reditary Lands, as well as in France after the Edict of  Nantes and in the 
underground circles of  English Catholicism – invariably included a treatise 
De iudice controversiarum.
The argumentation in their treatises was usually based on the linking 
of  two elements. The first was hermeneutical: since Scripture was not the 
transparent, perspicuous text proclaimed by Luther and the Reformation, 
an impartial judge was needed to resolve the virtually limitless points of  
conflict that could arise between different interpretations of  what was of-
ten a rather opaque and obscure text. The second element was analogical, 
and derived from the quintessentially Tridentine principle of  the visibility 
of  the Church and its nature as a societas perfecta, a society provided with all 
the necessary means to reach its own divine ends. «Just as in political and 
civil matters – Becanus wrote in his commentary to the Secunda secundae in 
1615 – quarrels and disputes often arise, requiring the presence of  a judge 
issuing a judgment over the parts, the same holds in matters of  faith and re-
ligion». Moreover, just as in regular tribunals a distinction is made between 
judge, law and jurisprudence, «in the same way, in controversies on faith 
we have the judge, the Scripture of  the two Testaments, and tradition».86
8. The theological-political conflict in the age of Paul V
Niccolò Lorini’s denunciation and Galileo’s letters to Benedetto Cas-
telli and Christina of  Lorraine came to the attention of  the Holy Office at 
the very moment when the hermeneutical and political importance of  the 
debate over who should be recognized as the ultimate judge in faith contro-
versies and biblical interpretation had reached its climax. The ruling élite in 
the Roman Curia had just come through a bruising doctrinal confrontation 
over the nature and boundaries of  ecclesiastical power – a battle that had 
mobilized governments and learned milieus from all over Europe – when 
it was asked to pass judgment on Galileo’s theses regarding the distinction 
between the spheres of  natural philosophy and divine Revelation, and the 
daring proposal for a heliocentric exegesis advanced by Foscarini.
As a matter of  fact, at that historical juncture not only Galileo, but 
also far more powerful political players emerging in the form of  secular 
States  –  with their own political doctrine and their own apologists who 
86 Becanus, De iudice controversiarum, in Opera omnia aucta revisa et in duos tomos distributa, 




were becoming ever more practiced in theological argumentation – were 
breaking the monopoly on the interpretation of  Scripture traditionally en-
trusted, in accordance with the Catholic system of  learning, to the schools 
of  the regular orders.
In 1609 the Letter of  Majesty, an edict emitted by Emperor Rudolf  II 
that guaranteed religious tolerance for his subjects in Bohemia, had been 
harshly criticized in Rome. Thereafter, for the ensuing decade up to the 
opening stages of  the Thirty Years War, the efforts of  Paul V and the Je-
suits  –  his strategists in the campaign to re-Catholicize the Hapsburg 
lands – had been directed at averting the danger that the Austrian, Hun-
garian, and Bohemian Stände might manipulate the imperial succession to 
their advantage.
Rome’s goal was to prevent a dynastic crisis in the House of  Hapsburg 
after Rudolf  II died, since the new emperor Matthias had no direct heirs, a 
situation that could have led to the assigning of  provisional powers to the 
Elector Palatine Frederick V, a prominent representative of  the aggressive 
Calvinist front. The imperial election of  Ferdinand of  Hapsburg in 1619, 
a model pupil of  the Jesuits and known for his religious devotion and his 
zealous campaign against the heretics, was an undeniable victory for the 
Apostolic See. In this and a handful of  other cases the notion that the pa-
pacy had the right to exercise surveillance over State affairs when these im-
pacted on the interests of  the Church assumed blatantly concrete form.87
Also in 1609 a book De potestate papae (‘On the power of  the pope’) 
was published in London. Its author, William Barclay, was a well-respected 
Catholic jurist of  Scottish origin who taught for thirty years in France, and 
King James I saw in him a precious ally in the war of  documents that he was 
waging against the papacy. Barclay laboured over his book for years, during 
the darkest period of  the French religious wars, during the reign of  Henry 
III. The debate between Rome and London about the Oath of  Allegiance 
and the Interdict of  Venice finally persuaded him to prepare a definitive 
version of  his work, which his son had published after his death.
Barclay’s aim was to advance a theological-political theory marked by 
an idea that had characterized the French Politiques – the division of  power 
between different spheres of  interest:
87 On the political dynamics in the Holy Roman Empire during the 1610s and 1620s with 
regard to the foreign policy of  the papacy, see Jan Paul Niederkorn, Papst, Kaiser und Reich 
während der letzten Regierungsjahre Kaiser Rudolfs II. (1605-1612), in Alexander Koller (ed.), Die 
Aussenbeziehungen der römischen Kurie unter Paul V. Borghese (1605-1621), Tübingen, Max Niemey-
er, 2008, pp. 83-99, and Koller, Papst, Kaiser und Reich am Vorabend des Dreissig jährigen Krieges 
(1612-1621). Die Sicherung der Sukzession Ferdinands von Innerösterreich, ibid., pp. 101-120.
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We must know that, since the beginning, those two powers by means of  which 
the world is bound to its duties, that is the political and the ecclesiastical, are so 
distinct and separate between them, that (though they both originate from God) 
each of  them is closed within its own limits, and cannot by its own right cross the 
boundaries of  the other, and neither of  them exercises power over the other.88
The authority over the civil commonwealth that was claimed, even if  
only in indirect form, by the popes was an usurpation of  power dating no 
further back than Gregory VII. Had God actually ordered it, the Church 
Fathers would have surely have advised the emperors about it.89 This was 
what Barclay argued, and there was no doubt at the time that he had on his 
side the composite Catholic world which Rome had distanced herself  f rom 
since the Council of  Trent.
The De potestate papae was placed on the Index in 1609 together with oth-
er titles, among them the Vindiciae contra tyrannos, a cornerstone of  Calvin-
ist political theory written by Iunius Brutus (Philippe de Duplessis-Mornay) 
some thirty years earlier, in 1579. Bellarmine refuted Barclay’s positions in 
his last published work on controversialist and theological-political issues, 
the De potestate Summi pontificis in rebus temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Bar-
claium (1610). In it Bellarmine presented well-known theses already elucidat-
ed in the Disputationes and widely taught in Jesuit schools; nevertheless, at 
the time it was received as an official intervention of  the Holy See, intended 
to reaffirm the doctrinal nature (as an article of  faith) of  the potestas indirecta 
of  the pope, against the Gallican tradition that prevailed in France.
The moment chosen could not have been worse: the deadly attack on 
Henry IV in May of  that year made the country sink again into the fear of  
religious war. As I have already noted, the De potestate Summi pontificis was 
condemned in November by the Paris Parliament. Just a few months ear-
lier the Parliament had condemned the De rege of  Father Juan de Mariana, 
the author who had come to be widely regarded as the Jesuit theorist of  
regicide.90
The death of  Henry IV marked the climax of  a historical stage in 
which the theoretical structure of  papal sovereignty proposed by the Ro-
88 William Barclay, De potestate papae, an et quatenus in reges et principes seculares ius et 
imperium habeat, Pont-à-Mousson, apud Iacobum Garnich, 1610, p. 9.
89 Ibid., p. 40.
90 Sylvio H. De Franceschi, La crise théologico-politique du premier âge baroque. Antiroma-
nisme doctrinale, pouvoir pastoral et raison du prince: le Saint-Siège face au prisme français (1607-
1627), Rome, École française de Rome, 2009, pp. 203 sq.; Stefania Tutino, Empire of  Souls. Rob-
ert Bellarmine and the Christian Commonwealth, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 160 sq.
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man Church in the second half  of  the 16th century reached a critical point 
within the context of  open conflict with other institutional players who 
were seeking to enforce their absolutist monarchical powers, as in the case 
of  England and France, or to reinforce or defend their customary rights, as 
in the case of  the Republic of  Venice. What these players were laying claim 
to was full autonomy in the realm of  the saeculum –  the political sphere 
with its own forms of  sovereignty and its own ties of  obedience and con-
trol between governing bodies and the governed, between the ruler and 
the ruled – and its separation from the realm of  spiritual matters and the 
authority of  the Church.
These players perceived the doctrine supporting the interference of  the 
Roman Church in the legitimate structures of  sovereign rule and in the 
jurisdiction of  the lay courts as a completely new and unjustified theory, 
fashioned in the theological workshops of  the papacy and overtly going 
against Christian tradition. In his writings on the Venetian Interdict, Sarpi 
never tired of  reaffirming that the reasons of  the Republic were founded 
on custom and the shared consensus of  the universal Church, while the 
pretensions of  Rome in matters pertaining to the judiciary and benefices 
originated out of  distorting modern trends on the part of  the Holy See: 
«A new doctrine seeking boundless and limitless power», aimed at handing 
over the rights and jurisdictions of  the community of  the faithful – abbots, 
bishops, chapters of  long-standing Venetian loyalty – to the agencies of  the 
Roman Curia.91
At the time, it must be said, clear boundaries dividing the spiritual and 
the temporal spheres did not exist, and could not even be defined due to 
the entangled rules in matters of  mixed jurisdiction (such as astrology, 
witchcraft, polygamy, and blasphemy), and because both spheres sought le-
gitimacy in the authority of  Scripture, and hence in the interpretation of  it.
William Barclay supported his arguments on the separation of  powers 
with numerous passages taken from the Old and New Testaments and the 
Church Fathers, as did Bellarmine in the treatise written to counter him. 
The difference lay in the fact that Bellarmine not only could counterpose 
interpretation to interpretation, biblical passage to biblical passage; he was 
also able to claim that his was the ultimate interpretation as it rested on the 
pope’s authority as the highest judge on matters of  controversy.
A theological argumentation would also be used by Galileo in his sec-
ond letter on sunspots, composed in 1612 and therefore shortly before his 
‘Copernican writings’. Here the scientist declared that the thesis of  the in-
91 Frajese, Sarpi scettico (cit. note 73), pp. 303 sq.
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corruptibility of  the heavens was linked to the ‘Aristotelian error’ of  the 
eternity of  the world, and hence was «an opinion that was not only false, 
but also erroneous, repulsing the unquestionable truths of  the Sacred Writ-
ings». Here Galileo was deploying expressions and judgments borrowed 
from the domain of  the Inquisition. Not by chance the Roman censorship 
intervened, requiring that this passage be erased from the text.92
The adoption of  the figure of  the iudex fidei by the controversialists 
meant that every proposition founded on Scriptural or, more generally, 
theological arguments fell under the jurisdiction of  the Chair of  Saint Pe-
ter, even if  only to establish whether or not something should be consid-
ered as pertaining to faith, as in the case of  Barclay’s De potestate papae. But 
the breadth and diffusion of  the religious discourse, as well as the promi-
nence of  the Bible as a virtually infinite repository of  ethical, political, and 
even scientific models, meant that the pope’s authority extended over an 
enormous area. Within a few years both the jurisdictional debates between 
the Apostolic See and its secular rivals, and the debate on the character of  
heliocentric theory would test the boundaries of  that jurisdiction.
It must be added that in the view of  the Roman Curia the distinction 
between the field of  the jurisdictional claims made by temporal powers 
and that of  real heresy was extremely nuanced.
France was a country of  two confessions, and in the Parliaments where 
debates over papal claims and Jesuit plots were being conducted, Protestant 
judges were also seated by right of  law. As for Venice, Paolo Sarpi was using 
all of  his influence and the English embassy was acting feverishly behind 
the scenes to bring about an official conversion of  the Republic’s ruling 
class to Protestantism, a possibility that was causing great concern to Pope 
Paul V.
The Anglican controversy itself – which raged between 1606 and 1610 
and sealed the minority status of  English Catholics well into the 19th cen-
tury – was played out in the vague borderline area dividing political obedi-
ence and membership in a religion.
With the Oath of  Allegiance imposed in 1606 on suspect recusants in 
the aftermath of  the Gunpowder Plot, King James sought to shed light on 
the distinction between ‘loyal’ subjects and the followers of  the potestas in-
directa – which, in his view, was tantamount to a theological justification of  
92 Galileo, Istoria e dimostrazioni intorno alle macchie solari, OG, V, pp. 138-140, n. 6. See 
Philippe Boulier, L’inaltérabilité du ciel pose un problème théologique, «Galilæana», 10, 2013, 
pp. 41-71: 53-54. According to the author, these expressions would be suggested by Castelli, in 
the perspective of  reconciling Galilean physics and Christian metaphysics.
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regicide. Indeed, the oath was formulated to include not only a declaration 
of  allegiance to the king but also the rejection of  the doctrine that the pope 
«hath any power or authoritie to depose the king, [...] or to authorize any 
forraigne prince, to invade or annoy him, or his countreys, or to discharge 
any of  his subiects of  their allegiance, and obedience to his Maiestie».93
According to King James the oath was merely a political measure – and, 
for the purposes of  my analysis, a further example of  a secular sovereign’s 
claim of  distinct and autonomous jurisdictions. In the view of  the Roman 
Curia it was instead a wholly unacceptable document, one containing he-
retical statements, and as such it was condemned by the Holy Office in the 
spring of  1606.
There followed a long, drawn-out controversy with repeated interven-
tions on both sides. It arose simultaneously with the Interdict and would 
continue for several years as a Europe-wide debate between the regnum and 
the sacerdotium (an issue later summarized in Hobbes’ Leviathan). In 1609 
King James addressed an Apology for the Oath of  Allegiance (Apologia pro iura-
mento fidelitatis) to all the princes of  Europe, an appeal to unite in defense of  
the rights of  the temporal powers (the papal nuncio in France, Monsignor 
Ubaldini, read between its lines «the style and opinions of  Fra Paolo»).94
English Catholics were forbidden to take the oath by Paul V’s brief  
Magno animi moerore issued in September 1606, «seeing it conteines many 
things which are flat contrary to faith, and salvation».95 In one of  his con-
tributions to the debate, the Apologia Matthaei Torti (1608), Bellarmine con-
firmed the dogmatic nature of  the indirect power of  the pope, and hence 
the impossibility of  separating membership in the Catholic Church and 
the obligation to obey the pope as one’s spiritual sovereign, i.e. higher in 
authority than any temporal prince:
This oath not only entails civil obedience in merely temporal matters, [...] 
but also the denial of  pontifical power, which is not a merely temporal matter, 
but a sacred matter, established by Heaven, which no mortal can abrogate, or 
diminish.96
93 The text of  the oath may be found in James I, Triplici nodo triplex cuneus. Or an apologie 
for the Oath of  allegiance, against the two breves of  Pope Paulus Quintus, and the late letter of  Cardinal 
Bellarmine to G. Blackwel the Archpriest, London, by Robert Barker, 1607, p. 48. See on the issue 
Motta, Bellarmino (cit. note 14), pp.  385 sq.; De Franceschi, La crise théologico-politique (cit. 
note 90), pp. 61 sq.; Tutino, Law and Conscience. Catholicism in Early Modern England, 1570-1625, 
Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007, pp. 117 sq.
94 De Franceschi, La crise théologico-politique (cit. note 90), p. 213.
95 James I, Triplici nodo triplex cuneus (cit. note 93), p. 49.
96 Tutino, Law and Conscience (cit. note 93), p. 165.
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This overlapping of  spheres was indeed implicit in the text of  the Oath: 
in a further passage, James’ subjects were asked to «abhorre, detest and 
abiure as impious and hereticall» the doctrine of  the dissolution of  the duty 
of  obedience to an excommunicated king, and to believe «in conscience» 
that the pope could not abolish the binding nature of  the oath itself.97
In all respects James was fully entitled, as the head of  the Church of  
England, to stigmatize a doctrine as impious and heretical, but of  course in 
the eyes of  Rome (notwithstanding his diplomatic expressions of  deference 
toward the prestige of  the Apostolic See), this could not but emphasize his 
heretical position. Even worse, his attempt to impose on his subjects a per-
suasion «in conscience» meant that temporal power was encroaching on 
the private sphere of  the individual conscience, a jurisdiction reserved for 
the Church and upon which it exerted rigid control by sacrament.98
In conclusion, I would like to highlight once again that the hermeneuti-
cal issue raised by Copernican cosmology occurred at a moment in history 
when the Roman Church was in deep crisis caused by what one might de-
scribe as an «excess of  sovereignty» in the person of  the pope, as had been 
envisaged by Catholic controversialist theology in the late 16th century on 
the basis of  the theological-political theory of  the judge of  controversies. 
This claim to sovereignty triggered a reaction from the defenders of  tem-
poral power, who were becoming increasingly accustomed to using theo-
logical arguments to legitimize their own jurisdictional claims.
The heart of  the crisis lay in the impossibility of  clearly dividing the 
spiritual and temporal jurisdictions in a context where the Bible still repre-
sented the norm and the reference text, but in Rome the very idea of  the 
separation and respective autonomy of  the two forms of  power was per-
ceived as a challenge to the full spiritual sovereignty of  the pope.
I therefore believe it is plausible to argue that this perception reflect-
ed – at least by analogy – on Galileo’s hermeneutical proposals, causing a 
reaction that was aimed at preventing another sphere of  jurisdiction (in this 
case the relationship between nature and Scripture) from being subtracted 
from the highest judge of  faith.
97 James I, Triplici nodo triplex cuneus (cit. note 93), p. 114.
98 This aspect of  the Oath of  allegiance has been underscored by Tutino, Law and Con-
science (cit. note 93), pp. 133 sq. On the different interpretations of  the document, see Johann P. 
Sommerville, Papalist Political Thought and the Controversy over the Jacobean Oath of  Allegiance, in 
Ethan H. Shagan (ed.), Catholics and the ‘Protestant Nation’. Religious Politics and Identity in Early 
Modern England, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2005, pp. 162-184.
